Subscribe to the gold package and get unlimited access to Shamra Academy
Register a new userCooperation percolation in spatial prisoners dilemma game
297
0
0.0
(
0
)
Ask ChatGPT about the research
No Arabic abstract
The paradox of cooperation among selfish individuals still puzzles scientific communities. Although a large amount of evidence has demonstrated that cooperator clusters in spatial games are effective to protect cooperators against the invasion of defectors, we continue to lack the condition for the formation of a giant cooperator cluster that assures the prevalence of cooperation in a system. Here, we study the dynamical organization of cooperator clusters in spatial prisoners dilemma game to offer the condition for the dominance of cooperation, finding that a phase transition characterized by the emergence of a large spanning cooperator cluster occurs when the initial fraction of cooperators exceeds a certain threshold. Interestingly, the phase transition belongs to different universality classes of percolation determined by the temptation to defect $b$. Specifically, on square lattices, $1<b<4/3$ leads to a phase transition pertaining to the class of regular site percolation, whereas $3/2<b<2$ gives rise to a phase transition subject to invasion percolation with trapping. Our findings offer deeper understanding of the cooperative behaviors in nature and society.
rate research
Read More
In real world, individual rationality varies for the sake of the diversity of peoples individuality. In order to investigate how diversity of agents rationality affects the evolution of cooperation, we introduce the individual rationality proportional to the $beta$th power of the each agents degree. Simulation results on heterogeneous scale-free network show that the dynamic process is greatly affected by the diversity of rationality. Both promotion and inhibition of cooperative behavior can be observed at different region of parameter $beta$. We present explanation to these results by quantitative and qualitative analysis. The nodes with middle degree value are found to play a critical role in the evolutionary processes. The inspiration from our work may provide us a deeper comprehension towards some social phenomenon.
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial Prisoners dilemma games with and without extortion by adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy updating manner (whether synchronous or asynchronous) and also the introduction of extortion strategy affect the collective outcome of the games. By means of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations as well as dynamical cluster techniques, we find that the involvement of extortioners facilitates the boom of cooperators in the population (and whom can always dominate the population if the temptation to defect is not too large) for both synchronous and asynchronous strategy updating, in stark contrast to the otherwise case, where cooperation is promoted for intermediate aspiration level with synchronous strategy updating, but is remarkably inhibited if the strategy updating is implemented asynchronously. We explain the results by configurational analysis and find that the presence of extortion leads to the checkerboard-like ordering of cooperators and extortioners, which enable cooperators to prevail in the population with both strategy updating manners. Moreover, extortion itself is evolutionary stable, and therefore acts as the incubator for the evolution of cooperation.
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoners dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower than the interaction timescale. This is done by implementing probabilistic reproduction on an individual level. We observe that both too fast and too slow reproduction rates hamper the emergence of cooperation. In other words, there exists an intermediate selection timescale that maximizes cooperation. Another factor we find to promote cooperation is a diversity of reproduction timescales.
We study an evolutionary prisoners dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy adoption (learning) mechanism. This system is investigated by means of Monte Carlo simulations and an extended pair-approximation method. We consider the average density of cooperators in the stationary state for a fixed interaction graph, while varying the number of edges in the learning graph. According to the Monte Carlo simulations, the cooperation is modified substantially in a way resembling a coherence-resonance-like behavior when the number of learning edges is increased. This behavior is reproduced by the analytical results.
In the evolutionary Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical rule. In its spatial version, agents do not play with every other but, instead, interact only with their neighbors, thus mimicking the existing of a social or contact network that defines who interacts with whom. In this work, we explore evolutionary, spatial PD systems consisting of two types of agents, each with a certain update (reproduction, learning) rule. We investigate two different scenarios: in the first case, update rules remain fixed for the entire evolution of the system; in the second case, agents update both strategy and update rule in every generation. We show that in a well-mixed population the evolutionary outcome is always full defection. We subsequently focus on two-strategy competition with nearest-neighbor interactions on the contact network and synchronized update of strategies. Our results show that, for an important range of the parameters of the game, the final state of the system is largely different from that arising from the usual setup of a single, fixed dynamical rule. Furthermore, the results are also very different if update rules are fixed or evolve with the strategies. In these respect, we have studied representative update rules, finding that some of them may become extinct while others prevail. We describe the new and rich variety of final outcomes that arise from this co-evolutionary dynamics. We include examples of other neighborhoods and asynchronous updating that confirm the robustness of our conclusions. Our results pave the way to an evolutionary rationale for modelling social interactions through game theory with a preferred set of update rules.
Log in to be able to interact and post comments
comments
Fetching comments
Sign in to be able to follow your search criteria
