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Register a new userDemand Side Management in Smart Grids using a Repeated Game Framework
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Added by
Linqi Song
Publication date
2013
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Demand side management (DSM) is a key solution for reducing the peak-time power consumption in smart grids. To provide incentives for consumers to shift their consumption to off-peak times, the utility company charges consumers differential pricing for using power at different times of the day. Consumers take into account these differential prices when deciding when and how much power to consume daily. Importantly, while consumers enjoy lower billing costs when shifting their power usage to off-peak times, they also incur discomfort costs due to the altering of their power consumption patterns. Existing works propose stationary strategies for the myopic consumers to minimize their short-term billing and discomfort costs. In contrast, we model the interaction emerging among self-interested, foresighted consumers as a repeated energy scheduling game and prove that the stationary strategies are suboptimal in terms of long-term total billing and discomfort costs. Subsequently, we propose a novel framework for determining optimal nonstationary DSM strategies, in which consumers can choose different daily power consumption patterns depending on their preferences, routines, and needs. As a direct consequence of the nonstationary DSM policy, different subsets of consumers are allowed to use power in peak times at a low price. The subset of consumers that are selected daily to have their joint discomfort and billing costs minimized is determined based on the consumers power consumption preferences as well as on the past history of which consumers have shifted their usage previously. Importantly, we show that the proposed strategies are incentive-compatible. Simulations confirm that, given the same peak-to-average ratio, the proposed strategy can reduce the total cost (billing and discomfort costs) by up to 50% compared to existing DSM strategies.
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