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Register a new userComment on Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography
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This is a comment on the publication by Yuan et al. [Appl. Phys. Lett. 98, 231104 (2011); arXiv:1106.2675v1 [quant-ph]].
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The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely on detectors to measure the relevant quantum property of single photons. Here we demonstrate experimentally that the detectors in two commercially available QKD systems can be fully remote-controlled using specially tailored bright illumination. This makes it possible to tracelessly acquire the full secret key; we propose an eavesdropping apparatus built of off-the-shelf components. The loophole is likely to be present in most QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes to detect single photons. We believe that our findings are crucial for strengthening the security of practical QKD, by identifying and patching technological deficiencies.
We propose and demonstrate a scheme to realize a high-efficiency truly quantum random number generator (RNG) at room temperature (RT). Using an effective extractor with simple time bin encoding method, the avalanche pulses of avalanche photodiode (APD) are converted into high-quality random numbers (RNs) that are robust to slow varying noise such as fluctuations of pulse intensity and temperature. A light source is compatible but not necessary in this scheme. Therefor the robustness of the system is effective enhanced. The random bits generation rate of this proof-of-principle system is 0.69 Mbps with double APDs and 0.34 Mbps with single APD. The results indicate that a high-speed RNG chip based on the scheme is potentially available with an integrable APD array.
It has previously been shown that the gated detectors of two commercially available quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are blindable and controllable by an eavesdropper using continuous-wave illumination and short bright trigger pulses, manipulating voltages in the circuit [L. Lydersen et al., Nat. Photonics DOI:10.1038/nphoton.2010.214]. This allows for an attack eavesdropping the full raw and secret key without increasing the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Here we show how thermal effects in detectors under bright illumination can lead to the same outcome. We demonstrate that the detectors in a commercial QKD system Clavis2 can be blinded by heating the avalanche photo diodes (APDs) using bright illumination, so-called thermal blinding. Further, the detectors can be triggered using short bright pulses once they are blind. For systems with pauses between packet transmission such as the plug-and-play systems, thermal inertia enables Eve to apply the bright blinding illumination before eavesdropping, making her more difficult to catch.
Several attacks have been proposed on quantum key distribution systems with gated single-photon detectors. The attacks involve triggering the detectors outside the center of the detector gate, and/or using bright illumination to exploit classical photodiode mode of the detectors. Hence a secure detection scheme requires two features: The detection events must take place in the middle of the gate, and the detector must be single-photon sensitive. Here we present a technique called bit-mapped gating, which is an elegant way to force the detections in the middle of the detector gate by coupling detection time and quantum bit error rate. We also discuss how to guarantee single-photon sensitivity by directly measuring detector parameters. Bit-mapped gating also provides a simple way to measure the detector blinding parameter in security proofs for quantum key distribution systems with detector efficiency mismatch, which up until now has remained a theoretical, unmeasurable quantity. Thus if single-photon sensitivity can be guaranteed within the gates, a detection scheme with bit-mapped gating satisfies the assumptions of the current security proofs.
While it is known that unconditionally secure position-based cryptography is impossible both in the classical and the quantum setting, it has been shown that some quantum protocols for position verification are secure against attackers which share a quantum state of bounded dimension. In this work, we consider the security of two protocols for quantum position verification that combine a single qubit with classical strings of total length $2n$: The qubit routing protocol, where the classical information prescribes the qubits destination, and a variant of the BB84-protocol for position verification, where the classical information prescribes in which basis the qubit should be measured. We show that either protocol is secure for a randomly chosen function if each of the attackers holds at most $n/2 - 5$ qubits. With this, we show for the first time that there exists a quantum position verification protocol where the ratio between the quantum resources an honest prover needs and the quantum resources the attackers need to break the protocol is unbounded. The verifiers need only increase the amount of classical resources to force the attackers to use more quantum resources. Concrete efficient functions for both protocols are also given -- at the expense of a weaker but still unbounded ratio of quantum resources for successful attackers. Finally, we show that both protocols are robust with respect to noise, making them appealing for applications.
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