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Register a new userOne Bad Apple Spoils the Bunch: Exploiting P2P Applications to Trace and Profile Tor Users
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Added by
Stevens Le Blond
Publication date
2011
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
Authors
Stevens Le Blond
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Tor is a popular low-latency anonymity network. However, Tor does not protect against the exploitation of an insecure application to reveal the IP address of, or trace, a TCP stream. In addition, because of the linkability of Tor streams sent together over a single circuit, tracing one stream sent over a circuit traces them all. Surprisingly, it is unknown whether this linkability allows in practice to trace a significant number of streams originating from secure (i.e., proxied) applications. In this paper, we show that linkability allows us to trace 193% of additional streams, including 27% of HTTP streams possibly originating from secure browsers. In particular, we traced 9% of Tor streams carried by our instrumented exit nodes. Using BitTorrent as the insecure application, we design two attacks tracing BitTorrent users on Tor. We run these attacks in the wild for 23 days and reveal 10,000 IP addresses of Tor users. Using these IP addresses, we then profile not only the BitTorrent downloads but also the websites visited per country of origin of Tor users. We show that BitTorrent users on Tor are over-represented in some countries as compared to BitTorrent users outside of Tor. By analyzing the type of content downloaded, we then explain the observed behaviors by the higher concentration of pornographic content downloaded at the scale of a country. Finally, we present results suggesting the existence of an underground BitTorrent ecosystem on Tor.
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Some BitTorrent users are running BitTorrent on top of Tor to preserve their privacy. In this extended abstract, we discuss three different attacks to reveal the IP address of BitTorrent users on top of Tor. In addition, we exploit the multiplexing of streams from different applications into the same circuit to link non-BitTorrent applications to revealed IP addresses.
This is a short note that formally presents the matching model for the theoretical study of self-adjusting networks as initially proposed in [1].
Centralized Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) when used in distributed systems have performance constraints as all traffic must traverse through a central server. In recent years, there has been a paradigm shift towards the use of P2P in VPNs to alleviate pressure placed upon the central server by allowing participants to communicate directly with each other, relegating the server to handling session management and supporting NAT traversal using relays when necessary. Another, less common, approach uses unstructured P2P systems to remove all centralization from the VPN. These approaches currently lack the depth in security options provided by other VPN solutions, and their scalability constraints have not been well studied. In this paper, we propose and implement a novel VPN architecture, which uses a structured P2P system for peer discovery, session management, NAT traversal, and autonomic relay selection and a central server as a partially-automated public key infrastructure (PKI) via a user-friendly web interface. Our model also provides the first design and implementation of a P2P VPN with full tunneling support, whereby all non-P2P based Internet traffic routes through a trusted third party and does so in a way that is more secure than existing full tunnel techniques. To verify our model, we evaluate our reference implementation by comparing it quantitatively to other VPN technologies focusing on latency, bandwidth, and memory usage. We also discuss some of our experiences with developing, maintaining, and deploying a P2P VPN.
Community decisions about access control in virtual communities are non-monotonic in nature. This means that they cannot be expressed in current, monotonic trust management languages such as the family of Role Based Trust Management languages (RT). To solve this problem we propose RT-, which adds a restricted form of negation to the standard RT language, thus admitting a controlled form of non-monotonicity. The semantics of RT- is discussed and presented in terms of the well-founded semantics for Logic Programs. Finally we discuss how chain discovery can be accomplished for RT-.
We study and compare three coded schemes for single-server wireless broadcast of multiple description coded content to heterogeneous users. The users (sink nodes) demand different number of descriptions over links with different packet loss rates. The three coded schemes are based on the LT codes, growth codes, and randomized chunked codes. The schemes are compared on the basis of the total number of transmissions required to deliver the demands of all users, which we refer to as the server (source) delivery time. We design the degree distributions of LT codes by solving suitably defined linear optimization problems, and numerically characterize the achievable delivery time for different coding schemes. We find that including a systematic phase (uncoded transmission) is significantly beneficial for scenarios with low demands, and that coding is necessary for efficiently delivering high demands. Different demand and error rate scenarios may require very different coding schemes. Growth codes and chunked codes do not perform as well as optimized LT codes in the heterogeneous communication scenario.
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