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Register a new userDe-anonymizing BitTorrent Users on Tor
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Added by
Arnaud Legout
Publication date
2010
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Some BitTorrent users are running BitTorrent on top of Tor to preserve their privacy. In this extended abstract, we discuss three different attacks to reveal the IP address of BitTorrent users on top of Tor. In addition, we exploit the multiplexing of streams from different applications into the same circuit to link non-BitTorrent applications to revealed IP addresses.
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Tor is a popular low-latency anonymity network. However, Tor does not protect against the exploitation of an insecure application to reveal the IP address of, or trace, a TCP stream. In addition, because of the linkability of Tor streams sent together over a single circuit, tracing one stream sent over a circuit traces them all. Surprisingly, it is unknown whether this linkability allows in practice to trace a significant number of streams originating from secure (i.e., proxied) applications. In this paper, we show that linkability allows us to trace 193% of additional streams, including 27% of HTTP streams possibly originating from secure browsers. In particular, we traced 9% of Tor streams carried by our instrumented exit nodes. Using BitTorrent as the insecure application, we design two attacks tracing BitTorrent users on Tor. We run these attacks in the wild for 23 days and reveal 10,000 IP addresses of Tor users. Using these IP addresses, we then profile not only the BitTorrent downloads but also the websites visited per country of origin of Tor users. We show that BitTorrent users on Tor are over-represented in some countries as compared to BitTorrent users outside of Tor. By analyzing the type of content downloaded, we then explain the observed behaviors by the higher concentration of pornographic content downloaded at the scale of a country. Finally, we present results suggesting the existence of an underground BitTorrent ecosystem on Tor.
Network latency and packet loss are considered to be an important requirement for realistic evaluation of Peer-to-Peer protocols. Dedicated clusters, such as Grid5000, do not provide the variety of network latency and packet loss rates that can be found in the Internet. However, compared to the experiments performed on testbeds such as PlanetLab, the experiments performed on dedicated clusters are reproducible, as the computational resources are not shared. In this paper, we perform experiments to study the impact of network latency and packet loss on the time required to download a file using BitTorrent. In our experiments, we observe a less than 15% increase on the time required to download a file when we increase the round-trip time between any two peers, from 0 ms to 400 ms, and the packet loss rate, from 0% to 5%. Our main conclusion is that the underlying network latency and packet loss have a marginal impact on the time required to download a file using BitTorrent. Hence, dedicated clusters such as Grid5000 can be safely used to perform realistic and reproducible BitTorrent experiments.
This is a short note that formally presents the matching model for the theoretical study of self-adjusting networks as initially proposed in [1].
In this paper, we study the impact of network latency on the time required to download a file distributed using BitTorrent. This study is essential to understand if testbeds can be used for experimental evaluation of BitTorrent. We observe that the network latency has a marginal impact on the time required to download a file; hence, BitTorrent experiments can performed on testbeds.
Anonymity networks are becoming increasingly popular in todays online world as more users attempt to safeguard their online privacy. Tor is currently the most popular anonymity network in use and provides anonymity to both users and services (hidden services). However, the anonymity provided by Tor is also being misused in various ways. Hosting illegal sites for selling drugs, hosting command and control servers for botnets, and distributing censored content are but a few such examples. As a result, various parties, including governments and law enforcement agencies, are interested in attacks that assist in de-anonymising the Tor network, disrupting its operations, and bypassing its censorship circumvention mechanisms. In this paper, we survey known Tor attacks and identify currently available techniques that lead to improved de-anonymisation of users and hidden services.
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