No Arabic abstract
We study the behavior of U.S. markets both before and after U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, and show that the announcement of a U.S. Federal Reserve rate change causes a financial shock, where the dynamics after the announcement is described by an analogue of the Omori earthquake law. We quantify the rate n(t) of aftershocks following an interest rate change at time T, and find power-law decay which scales as n(t-T) (t-T)^-$Omega$, with $Omega$ positive. Surprisingly, we find that the same law describes the rate n(|t-T|) of pre-shocks before the interest rate change at time T. This is the first study to quantitatively relate the size of the market response to the news which caused the shock and to uncover the presence of quantifiable preshocks. We demonstrate that the news associated with interest rate change is responsible for causing both the anticipation before the announcement and the surprise after the announcement. We estimate the magnitude of financial news using the relative difference between the U. S. Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds Effective rate. Our results are consistent with the sign effect, in which bad news has a larger impact than good news. Furthermore, we observe significant volatility aftershocks, confirming a market underreaction that lasts at least 1 trading day.
The model describing market dynamics after a large financial crash is considered in terms of the stochastic differential equation of Ito. Physically, the model presents an overdamped Brownian particle moving in the nonstationary one-dimensional potential $U$ under the influence of the variable noise intensity, depending on the particle position $x$. Based on the empirical data the approximate estimation of the Kramers-Moyal coefficients $D_{1,2}$ allow to predicate quite definitely the behavior of the potential introduced by $D_1 = - partial U /partial x$ and the volatility $sim sqrt{D_2}$. It has been shown that the presented model describes well enough the best known empirical facts relative to the large financial crash of October 1987.
Using a recently introduced method to quantify the time varying lead-lag dependencies between pairs of economic time series (the thermal optimal path method), we test two fundamental tenets of the theory of fixed income: (i) the stock market variations and the yield changes should be anti-correlated; (ii) the change in central bank rates, as a proxy of the monetary policy of the central bank, should be a predictor of the future stock market direction. Using both monthly and weekly data, we found very similar lead-lag dependence between the S&P500 stock market index and the yields of bonds inside two groups: bond yields of short-term maturities (Federal funds rate (FFR), 3M, 6M, 1Y, 2Y, and 3Y) and bond yields of long-term maturities (5Y, 7Y, 10Y, and 20Y). In all cases, we observe the opposite of (i) and (ii). First, the stock market and yields move in the same direction. Second, the stock market leads the yields, including and especially the FFR. Moreover, we find that the short-term yields in the first group lead the long-term yields in the second group before the financial crisis that started mid-2007 and the inverse relationship holds afterwards. These results suggest that the Federal Reserve is increasingly mindful of the stock market behavior, seen at key to the recovery and health of the economy. Long-term investors seem also to have been more reactive and mindful of the signals provided by the financial stock markets than the Federal Reserve itself after the start of the financial crisis. The lead of the S&P500 stock market index over the bond yields of all maturities is confirmed by the traditional lagged cross-correlation analysis.
We investigate financial market correlations using random matrix theory and principal component analysis. We use random matrix theory to demonstrate that correlation matrices of asset price changes contain structure that is incompatible with uncorrelated random price changes. We then identify the principal components of these correlation matrices and demonstrate that a small number of components accounts for a large proportion of the variability of the markets that we consider. We then characterize the time-evolving relationships between the different assets by investigating the correlations between the asset price time series and principal components. Using this approach, we uncover notable changes that occurred in financial markets and identify the assets that were significantly affected by these changes. We show in particular that there was an increase in the strength of the relationships between several different markets following the 2007--2008 credit and liquidity crisis.
We fill a void in merging empirical and phenomenological characterisation of the dynamical phase transitions in complex systems by identifying three of them on real-life financial markets. We extract and interpret the empirical, numerical, and semi-analytical evidences for the existence of these phase transitions, by considering the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE), as a typical example of a financial market of a medium size. Using the canonical object for the graph theory, i.e. the Minimal Spanning Tree (MST) network, we observe: (i) The initial phase transition from the equilibrium to non-equilibrium MST network in its nucleation phase, occurring at some critical time. Coalescence of edges on the FSEs transient leader is observed within the nucleation and is approximately characterized by the Lifsthiz-Slyozov growth exponent; (ii) The nucleation accelerates and transforms to the condensation process, in the second phase transition, forming a logarithmically diverging lambda-peak of short-range order parameters at the subsequent critical time - an analogon of such a transition in superfluidity; (iii) In the third phase transition, the peak logarithmically decreases over three quarters of the year, resulting in a few loosely connected sub-graphs. This peak is reminiscent of a non-equilibrium superstar-like superhub or a `dragon king effect, abruptly accelerating the evolution of the leader company. All these phase transitions are caused by the few richest vertices, which drift towards the leader and provide the most of the edges increasing the leaders degree. Thus, we capture an amazing phenomenon, likely of a more universal character, where a peripheral vertex becomes the one which is over dominating the complex network during an exceptionally long period of time.
In informationally efficient financial markets, option prices and this implied volatility should immediately be adjusted to new information that arrives along with a jump in underlyings return, whereas gradual changes in implied volatility would indicate market inefficiency. Using minute-by-minute data on S&P 500 index options, we provide evidence regarding delayed and gradual movements in implied volatility after the arrival of return jumps. These movements are directed and persistent, especially in the case of negative return jumps. Our results are significant when the implied volatilities are extracted from at-the-money options and out-of-the-money puts, while the implied volatility obtained from out-of-the-money calls converges to its new level immediately rather than gradually. Thus, our analysis reveals that the implied volatility smile is adjusted to jumps in underlyings return asymmetrically. Finally, it would be possible to have statistical arbitrage in zero-transaction-cost option markets, but under actual option price spreads, our results do not imply abnormal option returns.