Many real world complex systems such as infrastructure, communication and transportation networks are embedded in space, where entities of one system may depend on entities of other systems. These systems are subject to geographically localized failures due to malicious attacks or natural disasters. Here we study the resilience of a system composed of two interdependent spatially embedded networks to localized geographical attacks. We find that if an attack is larger than a finite (zero fraction of the system) critical size, it will spread through the entire system and lead to its complete collapse. If the attack is below the critical size, it will remain localized. In contrast, under random attack a finite fraction of the system needs to be removed to initiate system collapse. We present both numerical simulations and a theoretical approach to analyze and predict the effect of local attacks and the critical attack size. Our results demonstrate the high risk of local attacks on interdependent spatially embedded infrastructures and can be useful for designing more resilient systems.
We construct a network from climate records of atmospheric temperature at surface level, at different geographical sites in the globe, using reanalysis data from years 1948-2010. We find that the network correlates with the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), both locally in the north Atlantic, and through coupling to the southern Pacific Ocean. The existence of tele-connection links between those areas and their stability over time allows us to suggest a possible physical explanation for this phenomenon.
Recent studies show that in interdependent networks a very small failure in one network may lead to catastrophic consequences. Above a critical fraction of interdependent nodes, even a single node failure can invoke cascading failures that may abruptly fragment the system, while below this critical dependency (CD) a failure of few nodes leads only to small damage to the system. So far, the research has been focused on interdependent random networks without space limitations. However, many real systems, such as power grids and the Internet, are not random but are spatially embedded. Here we analytically and numerically analyze the stability of systems consisting of interdependent spatially embedded networks modeled as lattice networks. Surprisingly, we find that in lattice systems, in contrast to non-embedded systems, there is no CD and textit{any} small fraction of interdependent nodes leads to an abrupt collapse. We show that this extreme vulnerability of very weakly coupled lattices is a consequence of the critical exponent describing the percolation transition of a single lattice. Our results are important for understanding the vulnerabilities and for designing robust interdependent spatial embedded networks.
We construct and analyze climate networks based on daily satellite measurements of temperatures and geopotential heights. We show that these networks are stable during time and are similar over different altitudes. Each link in our network is stable with typical 15% variability. The entire hierarchy of links is about 80% consistent during time. We show that about half of this stability is due to the spatial 2D embedding of the network, and half is due to physical coupling mechanisms. The network stability of equatorial regions is found to be lower compared to the stability of a typical network in non-equatorial regions.
