Bayesian persuasion is the study of information sharing policies among strategic agents. A prime example is signaling in online ad auctions: what information should a platform signal to an advertiser regarding a user when selling the opportunity to advertise to her? Practical considerations such as preventing discrimination, protecting privacy or acknowledging limited attention of the information receiver impose constraints on information sharing. In this work, we propose and analyze a simple way to mathematically model such constraints as restrictions on Receivers admissible posterior beliefs. We consider two families of constraints - ex ante and ex post, where the latter limits each instance of Sender-Receiver communication, while the former more general family can also pose restrictions in expectation. For the ex ante family, Doval and Skreta establish the existence of an optimal signaling scheme with a small number of signals - at most the number of constraints plus the number of states of nature; we show this result is tight and provide an alternative proof for it. For the ex post family, we tighten a bound of V{o}lund, showing that the required number of signals is at most the number of states of nature, as in the original Kamenica-Gentzkow setting. As our main algorithmic result, we provide an additive bi-criteria FPTAS for an optimal constrained signaling scheme assuming a constant number of states; we improve the approximation to single-criteria under a Slater-like regularity condition. The FPTAS holds under standard assumptions; relaxed assumptions yield a PTAS. Finally, we bound the ratio between Senders optimal utility under convex ex ante constraints and the corresponding ex post constraints. This bound applies to finding an approximately welfare-maximizing constrained signaling scheme in ad auctions.
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