The Glosten-Milgrom model describes a single asset market, where informed traders interact with a market maker, in the presence of noise traders. We derive an analogy between this financial model and a Szilard information engine by {em i)} showing that the optimal work extraction protocol in the latter coincides with the pricing strategy of the market maker in the former and {em ii)} defining a market analogue of the physical temperature from the analysis of the distribution of market orders. Then we show that the expected gain of informed traders is bounded above by the product of this market temperature with the amount of information that informed traders have, in exact analogy with the corresponding formula for the maximal expected amount of work that can be extracted from a cycle of the information engine. This suggests that recent ideas from information thermodynamics may shed light on financial markets, and lead to generalised inequalities, in the spirit of the extended second law of thermodynamics.
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