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تسجيل مستخدم جديدTestability of evolutionary game dynamics models based on experimental economics data
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Understanding the dynamic processes of a real game system requires an appropriate dynamics model, and rigorously testing a dynamics model is non-trivial. In our methodological research, we develop an approach to testing the validity of game dynamics models that considers the dynamic patterns of angular momentum and speed as measurement variables. Using Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) games as an example, we illustrate the geometric patterns in the experiment data. We then derive the related theoretical patterns from a series of typical dynamics models. By testing the goodness-of-fit between the experimental and theoretical patterns, we show that the validity of these models can be evaluated quantitatively. Our approach establishes a link between dynamics models and experimental systems, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the most effective and rigorous strategy for ascertaining the testability of evolutionary game dynamics models.
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