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We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple Nash equilibria is analyzed. In particular, we construct an example of a spatial game with three strategies, where stochastic stability of Nash equilibria depends on the number of players and the kind of dynamics.
Field theory tools are applied to analytically study fluctuation and correlation effects in spatially extended stochastic predator-prey systems. In the mean-field rate equation approximation, the classic Lotka-Volterra model is characterized by neutr
We discuss long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting agents. In particular, three-player spatial games are studied. The effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria is investigated.
Recently, a first step was made by the authors towards a systematic investigation of the effect of reaction-step-size noise - uncertainty in the step size of the reaction - on the dynamics of stochastic populations. This was done by investigating the
We develop a new perturbation method for studying quasi-neutral competition in a broad class of stochastic competition models, and apply it to the analysis of fixation of competing strains in two epidemic models. The first model is a two-strain gener
In this paper I will review twenty years of work on the question: When is there coexistence in stochastic spatial models? The answer, announced in Durrett and Levin [Theor. Pop. Biol. 46 (1994) 363--394], and that we explain in this paper is that thi