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تسجيل مستخدم جديدA Game Characterization for Contrasimilarity
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Benjamin Bisping
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We present the first game characterization of contrasimilarity, the weakest form of bisimilarity. The game is finite for finite-state processes and can thus be used for contrasimulation equivalence checking, of which no tool has been capable to date. A machine-checked Isabelle/HOL formalization backs our work and enables further use of contrasimilarity in verification contexts.
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