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The Robustness of Graph k-shell Structure under Adversarial Attacks

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 نشر من قبل Bo Zhou
 تاريخ النشر 2021
  مجال البحث الهندسة المعلوماتية
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The k-shell decomposition plays an important role in unveiling the structural properties of a network, i.e., it is widely adopted to find the densest part of a network across a broad range of scientific fields, including Internet, biological networks, social networks, etc. However, there arises concern about the robustness of the k-shell structure when networks suffer from adversarial attacks. Here, we introduce and formalize the problem of the k-shell attack and develop an efficient strategy to attack the k-shell structure by rewiring a small number of links. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time to study the robustness of graph k-shell structure under adversarial attacks. In particular, we propose a Simulated Annealing (SA) based k-shell attack method and testify it on four real-world social networks. The extensive experiments validate that the k-shell structure of a network is robust under random perturbation, but it is quite vulnerable under adversarial attack, e.g., in Dolphin and Throne networks, more than 40% nodes change their k-shell values when only 10% links are changed based on our SA-based k-shell attack. Such results suggest that a single structural feature could also be significantly disturbed when only a small fraction of links are changed purposefully in a network. Therefore, it could be an interesting topic to improve the robustness of various network properties against adversarial attack in the future.



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