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تسجيل مستخدم جديدBBB-Voting: 1-out-of-k Blockchain-Based Boardroom Voting
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نشر من قبل
Ivan Homoliak Ph.D.
تاريخ النشر
2020
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
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Voting is a means to agree on a collective decision based on available choices (e.g., candidates), where participants (voters) agree to abide by their outcome. To improve some features of e-voting, decentralized solutions based on a blockchain can be employed, where the blockchain represents a public bulletin board that in contrast to a centralized bulletin board provides $100%$ availability and censorship resistance. A blockchain ensures that all entities in the voting system have the same view of the actions made by others due to its immutable and append-only log. The existing blockchain-based boardroom voting solution called Open Voting Network (OVN) provides the privacy of votes and perfect ballot secrecy, but it supports only two candidates. We present BBB-Voting, an equivalent blockchain-based approach for decentralized voting than OVN, but in contrast to it, BBB-Voting supports 1-out-of-$k$ choices and provides a fault tolerance mechanism that enables recovery from stalling participants. We provide a cost-optimized implementation using Ethereum, which we compare with OVN and show that our work decreases the costs for voters by $13.5%$ in terms of gas consumption. Next, we outline the extension of our implementation scaling to magnitudes higher number of participants than in a boardroom voting, while preserving the costs paid by the authority and participants -- we made proof-of-concept experiments with up to 1000 participants.
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