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Social graphs are widely used in research (e.g., epidemiology) and business (e.g., recommender systems). However, sharing these graphs poses privacy risks because they contain sensitive information about individuals. Graph anonymization techniques aim to protect individual users in a graph, while graph de-anonymization aims to re-identify users. The effectiveness of anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms is usually evaluated with privacy metrics. However, it is unclear how strong existing privacy metrics are when they are used in graph privacy. In this paper, we study 26 privacy metrics for graph anonymization and de-anonymization and evaluate their strength in terms of three criteria: monotonicity indicates whether the metric indicates lower privacy for stronger adversaries; for within-scenario comparisons, evenness indicates whether metric values are spread evenly; and for between-scenario comparisons, shared value range indicates whether metrics use a consistent value range across scenarios. Our extensive experiments indicate that no single metric fulfills all three criteria perfectly. We therefore use methods from multi-criteria decision analysis to aggregate multiple metrics in a metrics suite, and we show that these metrics suites improve monotonicity compared to the best individual metric. This important result enables more monotonic, and thus more accurate, evaluations of new graph anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms.
In this paper, we propose to use production executions to improve the quality of testing for certain methods of interest for developers. These methods can be methods that are not covered by the existing test suite, or methods that are poorly tested.
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have been widely applied to various fields due to their powerful representations of graph-structured data. Despite the success of GNNs, most existing GNNs are designed to learn node representations on the fixed and homoge
WhatsApp messenger is arguably the most popular mobile app available on all smart-phones. Over one billion people worldwide for free messaging, calling, and media sharing use it. In April 2016, WhatsApp switched to a default end-to-end encrypted serv
Machine learned models trained on organizational communication data, such as emails in an enterprise, carry unique risks of breaching confidentiality, even if the model is intended only for internal use. This work shows how confidentiality is distinc
To this date, CAPTCHAs have served as the first line of defense preventing unauthorized access by (malicious) bots to web-based services, while at the same time maintaining a trouble-free experience for human visitors. However, recent work in the lit