اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدA network model of immigration: Enclave formation vs. cultural integration
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Successfully integrating newcomers into native communities has become a key issue for policy makers, as the growing number of migrants has brought cultural diversity, new skills, and at times, societal tensions to receiving countries. We develop an agent-based network model to study interacting hosts and guests and identify the conditions under which cooperative/integrated or uncooperative/segregated societies arise. Players are assumed to seek socioeconomic prosperity through game theoretic rules that shift network links, and cultural acceptance through opinion dynamics. We find that the main predictor of integration under given initial conditions is the timescale associated with cultural adjustment relative to social link remodeling, for both guests and hosts. Fast cultural adjustment results in cooperation and the establishment of host-guest connections that are sustained over long times. Conversely, fast social link remodeling leads to the irreversible formation of isolated enclaves, as migrants and natives optimize their socioeconomic gains through in-group connections. We discuss how migrant population sizes and increasing socioeconomic rewards for host-guest interactions, through governmental incentives or by admitting migrants with highly desirable skills, may affect the overall immigrant experience.
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