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تسجيل مستخدم جديدOnline Trading as a Secretary Problem
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We consider the online problem in which an intermediary trades identical items with a sequence of n buyers and n sellers, each of unit demand. We assume that the values of the traders are selected by an adversary and the sequence is randomly permuted. We give competitive algorithms for two objectives: welfare and gain-from-trade.
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We study secretary problems in settings with multiple agents. In the standard secretary problem, a sequence of arbitrary awards arrive online, in a random order, and a single decision maker makes an immediate and irrevocable decision whether to accep
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In the classical secretary problem, one attempts to find the maximum of an unknown and unlearnable distribution through sequential search. In many real-world searches, however, distributions are not entirely unknown and can be learned through experie
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In the secretary problem we are faced with an online sequence of elements with values. Upon seeing an element we have to make an irrevocable take-it-or-leave-it decision. The goal is to maximize the probability of picking the element of maximum value
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In this paper we consider the so-called Multi-returning secretary problem, a version of the Secretary problem in which each candidate has $m$ identical copies. The case $m=2$ has already been completely solved by several authors using different metho
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