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Control studies attempts to set the outcome of elections through the addition, deletion, or partition of voters or candidates. The set of benchmark control types was largely set in the seminal 1992 paper by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick that introduced control, and there now is a large literature studying how many of the benchmark types various election systems are vulnerable to, i.e., have polynomial-time attack algorithms for. However, although the longstanding benchmark models of addition and deletion model relatively well the real-world settings that inspire them, the longstanding benchmark models of partition model settings that are arguably quite distant from those they seek to capture. In this paper, we introduce--and for some important cases analyze the complexity of--new partition models that seek to better capture many real-world partition settings. In particular, in many partition settings one wants the two parts of the partition to be of (almost) equal size, or is partitioning into more than two parts, or has groups of actors who must be placed in the same part of the partition. Our hope is that having these new partition types will allow studies of control attacks to include such models that more realistically capture many settings.
Previous work on voter control, which refers to situations where a chair seeks to change the outcome of an election by deleting, adding, or partitioning voters, takes for granted that the chair knows all the voters preferences and that all votes are
We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [Electoral Studies, 25(2):287-305, 2006], and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding inadmissible votes
Walsh [Wal10, Wal09], Davies et al. [DKNW10, DKNW11], and Narodytska et al. [NWX11] studied various voting systems empirically and showed that they can often be manipulated effectively, despite their manipulation problems being NP-hard. Such an exper
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We introduce a fram
Candidate control of elections is the study of how adding or removing candidates can affect the outcome. However, the traditional study of the complexity of candidate control is in the model in which all candidates and votes are known up front. This