اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدValue of information in noncooperative games
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In some games, additional information hurts a player, e.g., in games with first-mover advantage, the second-mover is hurt by seeing the first-movers move. What properties of a game determine whether it has such negative value of information for a particular player? Can a game have negative value of information for all players? To answer such questions, we generalize the definition of marginal utility of a good to define the marginal utility of a parameter vector specifying a game. So rather than analyze the global structure of the relationship between a games parameter vector and player behavior, as in previous work, we focus on the local structure of that relationship. This allows us to prove that generically, every game can have negative marginal value of information, unless one imposes a priori constraints on allowed changes to the games parameter vector. We demonstrate these and related results numerically, and discuss their implications.
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