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تسجيل مستخدم جديدTrue-MCSA: A Framework for Truthful Double Multi-Channel Spectrum Auctions
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We design a framework for truthful double multi-channel spectrum auctions where each seller (or buyer) can sell (or buy) multiple spectrum channels based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing spectrum owners (as sellers) to lease their selected idle spectrum channels to new spectrum users (as buyers) who need the spectrum desperately. The most significant requirement is how to make the auction economic-robust (truthful in particular) while enabling spectrum reuse to improve spectrum utilization. Additionally, in practice, both sellers and buyers would require to trade multiple channels at one time, while guaranteeing their individual profitability. Unfortunately, none of the existing designs can meet all these requirements simultaneously. We address these requirements by proposing True-MCSA, a framework for truthful double multi-channel spectrum auctions. True-MCSA takes as input any reusability-driven spectrum allocation algorithm, introduces novel virtual buyer group (VBG) splitting and bidding algorithms, and applies a winner determination and pricing mechanism to achieve truthfulness and other economic properties while improving spectrum utilization and successfully dealing with multi-channel requests from both buyers and sellers. Our results show that the auction efficiency is impacted by the economic factors with efficiency degradations within 30%, under different experimental settings. Furthermore, the experimental results indicate that we can improve the auction efficiency by choosing a proper bidding algorithm and using a base bid. True-MCSA makes an important contribution on enabling spectrum reuse to improve auction efficiency in multi-channel cases.
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