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تسجيل مستخدم جديدSecurity problem on arbitrated quantum signature schemes
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Until now, there have been developed many arbitrated quantum signature schemes implemented with a help of a trusted third party. In order to guarantee the unconditional security, most of them take advantage of the optimal quantum one-time encryption method based on Pauli operators. However, we in this paper point out that the previous schemes only provides a security against total break and actually show that there exists a simple existential forgery attack to validly modify the transmitted pair of message and signature. In addition, we also provide a simple method to recover the security against the proposed attack.
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