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تسجيل مستخدم جديدTime-cost analysis of a quantum key distribution system clocked at 100 MHz
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We describe the realization of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system clocked at 100 MHz. The system includes classical postprocessing implemented via software, and is operated over a 12 km standard telecommunication dark fiber in a real-world environment. A time-cost analysis of the sifted, error-corrected, and secret key rates relative to the raw key rate is presented, and the scalability of our implementation with respect to higher secret key rates is discussed.
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