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تسجيل مستخدم جديدRelative Strength of Strategy Elimination Procedures
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Krzysztof R. Apt
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We compare here the relative strength of four widely used procedures on finite strategic games: iterated elimination of weakly/strictly dominated strategies by a pure/mixed strategy. A complication is that none of these procedures is based on a monotonic operator. To deal with this problem we use globa
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