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Register a new userDefending with Shared Resources on a Network
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Added by
Xiaowei Wu
Publication date
2019
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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In this paper we consider a defending problem on a network. In the model, the defender holds a total defending resource of R, which can be distributed to the nodes of the network. The defending resource allocated to a node can be shared by its neighbors. There is a weight associated with every edge that represents the efficiency defending resources are shared between neighboring nodes. We consider the setting when each attack can affect not only the target node, but its neighbors as well. Assuming that nodes in the network have different treasures to defend and different defending requirements, the defender aims at allocating the defending resource to the nodes to minimize the loss due to attack. We give polynomial time exact algorithms for two important special cases of the network defending problem. For the case when an attack can only affect the target node, we present an LP-based exact algorithm. For the case when defending resources cannot be shared, we present a max-flow-based exact algorithm. We show that the general problem is NP-hard, and we give a 2-approximation algorithm based on LP-rounding. Moreover, by giving a matching lower bound of 2 on the integrality gap on the LP relaxation, we show that our rounding is tight.
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In classic network security games, the defender distributes defending resources to the nodes of the network, and the attacker attacks a node, with the objective to maximize the damage caused. Existing models assume that the attack at node u causes damage only at u. However, in many real-world security scenarios, the attack at a node u spreads to the neighbors of u and can cause damage at multiple nodes, e.g., for the outbreak of a virus. In this paper, we consider the network defending problem against contagious attacks. Existing works that study shared resources assume that the resource allocated to a node can be shared or duplicated between neighboring nodes. However, in real world, sharing resource naturally leads to a decrease in defending power of the source node, especially when defending against contagious attacks. To this end, we study the model in which resources allocated to a node can only be transferred to its neighboring nodes, which we refer to as a reallocation process. We show that this more general model is difficult in two aspects: (1) even for a fixed allocation of resources, we show that computing the optimal reallocation is NP-hard; (2) for the case when reallocation is not allowed, we show that computing the optimal allocation (against contagious attack) is also NP-hard. For positive results, we give a mixed integer linear program formulation for the problem and a bi-criteria approximation algorithm. Our experimental results demonstrate that the allocation and reallocation strategies our algorithm computes perform well in terms of minimizing the damage due to contagious attacks.
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