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Register a new userBinary Mean Field Stochastic Games: Stationary Equilibria and Comparative Statics
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This paper considers mean field games in a multi-agent Markov decision process (MDP) framework. Each player has a continuum state and binary action, and benefits from the improvement of the condition of the overall population. Based on an infinite horizon discounted individual cost, we show existence of a stationary equilibrium, and prove its uniqueness under a positive externality condition. We further analyze comparative statics of the stationary equilibrium by quantitatively determining the impact of the effort cost.
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In the context of simple finite-state discrete time systems, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called correlated solution, which can be seen as the mean field game analogue of a correlated equilibrium. Our notion of solution is justified in two ways: We prove that correlated solutions arise as limits of exchangeable correlated equilibria in restricted (Markov open-loop) strategies for the underlying $N$-player games, and we show how to construct approximate $N$-player correlated equilibria starting from a correlated solution to the mean field game.
This paper studies an asymptotic solvability problem for linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games with controlled diffusions and indefinite weights for the state and control in the costs. We employ a rescaling approach to derive a low dimensional Riccati ordinary differential equation (ODE) system, which characterizes a necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic solvability. The rescaling technique is further used for performance estimates, establishing an $O(1/N)$-Nash equilibrium for the obtained decentralized strategies.
We address the numerical approximation of Mean Field Games with local couplings. For power-like Hamiltonians, we consider both unconstrained and constrained stationary systems with density constraints in order to model hard congestion effects. For finite difference discretizations of the Mean Field Game system, we follow a variational approach. We prove that the aforementioned schemes can be obtained as the optimality system of suitably defined optimization problems. In order to prove the existence of solutions of the scheme with a variational argument, the monotonicity of the coupling term is not used, which allow us to recover general existence results. Next, assuming next that the coupling term is monotone, the variational problem is cast as a convex optimization problem for which we study and compare several proximal type methods. These algorithms have several interesting features, such as global convergence and stability with respect to the viscosity parameter, which can eventually be zero. We assess the performance of the methods via numerical experiments.
Mean field games (MFGs) and the best reply strategy (BRS) are two methods of describing competitive optimisation of systems of interacting agents. The latter can be interpreted as an approximation of the respective MFG system. In this paper we present a systematic analysis and comparison of the two approaches in the stationary case. We provide novel existence and uniqueness results for the stationary boundary value problems related to the MFG and BRS formulations, and we present an analytical and numerical comparison of the two paradigms in a variety of modelling situations.
Mean field games are concerned with the limit of large-population stochastic differential games where the agents interact through their empirical distribution. In the classical setting, the number of players is large but fixed throughout the game. However, in various applications, such as population dynamics or economic growth, the number of players can vary across time which may lead to different Nash equilibria. For this reason, we introduce a branching mechanism in the population of agents and obtain a variation on the mean field game problem. As a first step, we study a simple model using a PDE approach to illustrate the main differences with the classical setting. We prove existence of a solution and show that it provides an approximate Nash-equilibrium for large population games. We also present a numerical example for a linear--quadratic model. Then we study the problem in a general setting by a probabilistic approach. It is based upon the relaxed formulation of stochastic control problems which allows us to obtain a general existence result.
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