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Register a new userComputing Power, Key Length and Cryptanalysis. An Unending Battle?
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Added by
Aristides Dasso Mr
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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There are several methods to measure computing power. On the other hand, Bit Length (BL) can be considered a metric to measure the strength of an asymmetric encryption method. We review here ways to determine the security, given an span of time, of a factoring-based encryption method, such as RSA, by establishing a relation between the processing power needed to break a given encryption and the given bit length used in the encryption. This relation would help us provide an estimation of the time span that an encryption method for a given BL will be secure from attacks.
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