Subscribe to the gold package and get unlimited access to Shamra Academy
Register a new userAn Incentive-Based Mechanism for Volunteer Computing using Blockchain
231
0
0.0
(
0
)
Added by
Moayad Aloqaily
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
Ask ChatGPT about the research
No Arabic abstract
The rise of fast communication media both at the core and at the edge has resulted in unprecedented numbers of sophisticated and intelligent wireless IoT devices. Tactile Internet has enabled the interaction between humans and machines within their environment to achieve revolutionized solutions both on the move and in real-time. Many applications such as intelligent autonomous self-driving, smart agriculture and industrial solutions, and self-learning multimedia content filtering and sharing have become attainable through cooperative, distributed and decentralized systems, namely, volunteer computing. This article introduces a blockchain-enabled resource sharing and service composition solution through volunteer computing. Device resource, computing, and intelligence capabilities are advertised in the environment to be made discoverable and available for sharing with the aid of blockchain technology. Incentives in the form of on-demand service availability are given to resource and service providers to ensure fair and balanced cooperative resource usage. Blockchains are formed whenever a service request is initiated with the aid of fog and mobile edge computing (MEC) devices to ensure secure communication and service delivery for the participants. Using both volunteer computing techniques and tactile internet architectures, we devise a fast and reliable service provisioning framework that relies on a reinforcement learning technique. Simulation results show that the proposed solution can achieve high reward distribution, increased number of blockchain formations, reduced delays, and balanced resource usage among participants, under the premise of high IoT device availability.
rate research
Read More
The current situation of COVID-19 demands novel solutions to boost healthcare services and economic growth. A full-fledged solution that can help the government and people retain their normal lifestyle and improve the economy is crucial. By bringing into the picture a unique incentive-based approach, the strain of government and the people can be greatly reduced. By providing incentives for actions such as voluntary testing, isolation, etc., the government can better plan strategies for fighting the situation while people in need can benefit from the incentive offered. This idea of combining strength to battle against the virus can bring out newer possibilities that can give an upper hand in this war. As the unpredictable future develops, sharing and maintaining COVID related data of every user could be the needed trigger to kick start the economy and blockchain paves the way for this solution with decentralization and immutability of data.
Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners participation and may jeopardize the blockchain security. We propose to mitigate this blockchain insufficient fee issue through a Fee and Waiting Tax (FWT) mechanism, which explicitly considers the two types of negative externalities in the system. Specifically, we model the interactions between the protocol designer, users, and miners as a three-stage Stackelberg game. By characterizing the equilibrium of the game, we find that miners neglecting the negative externality in transaction selection cause they are willing to accept insufficient-fee transactions. This leads to the insufficient storage fee issue in the existing protocol. Moreover, our proposed optimal FWT mechanism can motivate users to pay sufficient transaction fees to cover the storage costs and achieve the unconstrained social optimum. Numerical results show that the optimal FWT mechanism guarantees sufficient transaction fees and achieves an average social welfare improvement of 33.73% or more over the existing protocol. Furthermore, the optimal FWT mechanism achieves the maximum fairness index and performs well even under heterogeneous-storage-cost miners.
Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which leverages the ubiquity of sensor-equipped mobile devices to collect data. To achieve good quality for crowd sensing, incentive mechanisms are indispensable to attract more participants. Most of existing mechanisms focus on the expected utility prior to sensing, ignoring the risk of low quality solution and privacy leakage. Traditional incentive mechanisms such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and its variants are not applicable here. In this paper, to address these challenges, we propose a behavior based incentive mechanism for crowd sensing applications with budget constraints by applying sequential all-pay auctions in mobile social networks (MSNs), not only to consider the effects of extensive user participation, but also to maximize high quality of the context based sensing content submission for crowd sensing platform under the budget constraints, where users arrive in a sequential order. Through an extensive simulation, results indicate that incentive mechanisms in our proposed framework outperform the best existing solution.
Mining in the blockchain requires high computing power to solve the hash puzzle for example proof-of-work puzzle. It takes high cost to achieve the calculation of this problem in devices of IOT, especially the mobile devices of IOT. It consequently restricts the application of blockchain in mobile environment. However, edge computing can be utilized to solve the problem for insufficient computing power of mobile devices in IOT. Edge servers can recruit many mobile devices to contribute computing power together to mining and share the reward of mining with these recruited mobile devices. In this paper, we propose an incentivizing mechanism based on edge computing for mobile blockchain. We design a two-stage Stackelberg Game to jointly optimize the reward of edge servers and recruited mobile devices. The edge server as the leader sets the expected fee for the recruited mobile devices in Stage I. The mobile device as a follower provides its computing power to mine according to the expected fee in Stage. It proves that this game can obtain a uniqueness Nash Equilibrium solution under the same or different expected fee. In the simulation experiment, we obtain a result curve of the profit for the edge server with the different ratio between the computing power from the edge server and mobile devices. In addition, the proposed scheme has been compared with the MDG scheme for the profit of the edge server. The experimental results show that the profit of the proposed scheme is more than that of the MDG scheme under the same total computing power.
Volunteer Computing, sometimes called Public Resource Computing, is an emerging computational model that is very suitable for work-pooled parallel processing. As more complex grid applications make use of work flows in their design and deployment it is reasonable to consider the impact of work flow deployment over a Volunteer Computing infrastructure. In this case, the inter work flow I/O can lead to a significant increase in I/O demands at the work pool server. A possible solution is the use of a Peer-to- Peer based parallel computing architecture to off-load this I/O demand to the workers; where the workers can fulfill some aspects of work flow coordination and I/O checking, etc. However, achieving robustness in such a large scale system is a challenging hurdle towards the decentralized execution of work flows and general parallel processes. To increase robustness, we propose and show the merits of using an adaptive checkpoint scheme that efficiently checkpoints the status of the parallel processes according to the estimation of relevant network and peer parameters. Our scheme uses statistical data observed during runtime to dynamically make checkpoint decisions in a completely de- centralized manner. The results of simulation show support for our proposed approach in terms of reduced required runtime.
Log in to be able to interact and post comments
comments
Fetching comments
Sign in to be able to follow your search criteria
