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Register a new userEfficiency of equilibria in games with random payoffs
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Added by
Matteo Quattropani
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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We consider normal-form games with $n$ players and two strategies for each player, where the payoffs are i.i.d. random variables with some distribution $F$ and we consider issues related to the pure equilibria in the game as the number of players diverges. It is well-known that, if the distribution $F$ has no atoms, the random number of pure equilibria is asymptotically Poisson$(1)$. In the presence of atoms, it diverges. For each strategy profile, we consider the (random) average payoff of the players, called Average Social Utility (ASU). In particular, we examine the asymptotic behavior of the optimum ASU and the one associated to the best and worst pure Nash equilibria and we show that, although these quantities are random, they converge, as $ntoinfty$ to some deterministic quantities.
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