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Register a new userLocal Convolutions Cause an Implicit Bias towards High Frequency Adversarial Examples
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Despite great efforts, neural networks are still prone to adversarial attacks. Recent work has shown that adversarial perturbations typically contain high-frequency features, but the root cause of this phenomenon remains unknown. Inspired by the theoretical work in linear full-width convolutional models (Gunasekar et al, 2018), we hypothesize that the nonlinear local (i.e. bounded-width) convolutional models used in practice are implicitly biased to learn high frequency features, and that this is the root cause of high frequency adversarial examples. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed the impact of different choices of linear and nonlinear architectures on the implicit bias of the learned features and the adversarial perturbations, in both spatial and frequency domains. We find that the high-frequency adversarial perturbations are critically dependent on the convolution operation in two ways: (i) the translation invariance of the convolution induces an implicit bias towards sparsity in the frequency domain; and (ii) the spatially-limited nature of local convolutions induces an implicit bias towards high frequency features. The explanation for the latter involves the Fourier Uncertainty Principle: a spatially-limited (local in the space domain) filter cannot also be frequency-limited (local in the frequency domain). Furthermore, using larger convolution kernel sizes or avoiding convolutions altogether (e.g. by using Visual Transformers architecture) significantly reduces this high frequency bias, but not the overall susceptibility to attacks. Looking forward, our work strongly suggests that understanding and controlling the implicit bias of architectures will be essential for achieving adversarial robustness.
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