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Register a new userSecuring Internet Applications from Routing Attacks
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Added by
Yixin Sun
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Attacks on Internet routing are typically viewed through the lens of availability and confidentiality, assuming an adversary that either discards traffic or performs eavesdropping. Yet, a strategic adversary can use routing attacks to compromise the security of critical Internet applications like Tor, certificate authorities, and the bitcoin network. In this paper, we survey such application-specific routing attacks and argue that both application-layer and network-layer defenses are essential and urgently needed. While application-layer defenses are easier to deploy in the short term, we hope that our work serves to provide much needed momentum for the deployment of network-layer defenses.
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Routing attacks remain practically effective in the Internet today as existing countermeasures either fail to provide protection guarantees or are not easily deployable. Blockchain systems are particularly vulnerable to such attacks as they rely on Internet-wide communication to reach consensus. In particular, Bitcoin -the most widely-used cryptocurrency- can be split in half by any AS-level adversary using BGP hijacking. In this paper, we present SABRE, a secure and scalable Bitcoin relay network which relays blocks worldwide through a set of connections that are resilient to routing attacks. SABRE runs alongside the existing peer-to-peer network and is easily deployable. As a critical system, SABRE design is highly resilient and can efficiently handle high bandwidth loads, including Denial of Service attacks. We built SABRE around two key technical insights. First, we leverage fundamental properties of inter-domain routing (BGP) policies to host relay nodes: (i) in locations that are inherently protected against routing attacks; and (ii) on paths that are economically preferred by the majority of Bitcoin clients. These properties are generic and can be used to protect other Blockchain-based systems. Second, we leverage the fact that relaying blocks is communication-heavy, not computation-heavy. This enables us to offload most of the relay operations to programmable network hardware (using the P4 programming language). Thanks to this hardware/software co-design, SABRE nodes operate seamlessly under high load while mitigating the effects of malicious clients. We present a complete implementation of SABRE together with an extensive evaluation. Our results demonstrate that SABRE is effective at securing Bitcoin against routing attacks, even with deployments as small as 6 nodes.
Storage networking technology has enjoyed strong growth in recent years, but security concerns and threats facing networked data have grown equally fast. Today, there are many potential threats that are targeted at storage networks, including data modification, destruction and theft, DoS attacks, malware, hardware theft and unauthorized access, among others. In order for a Storage Area Network (SAN) to be secure, each of these threats must be individually addressed. In this paper, we present a comparative study by implementing different security methods in IP Storage network.
BGP-Multipath (BGP-M) is a multipath routing technique for load balancing. Distinct from other techniques deployed at a router inside an Autonomous System (AS), BGP-M is deployed at a border router that has installed multiple inter-domain border links to a neighbour AS. It uses the equal-cost multi-path (ECMP) function of a border router to share traffic to a destination prefix on different border links. Despite recent research interests in multipath routing, there is little study on BGP-M. Here we provide the first measurement and a comprehensive analysis of BGP-M routing in the Internet. We extracted information on BGP-M from query data collected from Looking Glass (LG) servers. We revealed that BGP-M has already been extensively deployed and used in the Internet. A particular example is Hurricane Electric (AS6939), a Tier-1 network operator, which has implemented >1,000 cases of BGP-M at 69 of its border routers to prefixes in 611 of its neighbour ASes, including many hyper-giant ASes and large content providers, on both IPv4 and IPv6 Internet. We examined the distribution and operation of BGP-M. We also ran traceroute using RIPE Atlas to infer the routing paths, the schemes of traffic allocation, and the delay on border links. This study provided the state-of-the-art knowledge on BGP-M with novel insights into the unique features and the distinct advantages of BGP-M as an effective and readily available technique for load balancing.
Industrial control systems (ICS) are managed remotely with the help of dedicated protocols that were originally designed to work in walled gardens. Many of these protocols have been adapted to Internet transport and support wide-area communication. ICS now exchange insecure traffic on an inter-domain level, putting at risk not only common critical infrastructure but also the Internet ecosystem (e.g., DRDoS~attacks). In this paper, we uncover unprotected inter-domain ICS traffic at two central Internet vantage points, an IXP and an ISP. This traffic analysis is correlated with data from honeypots and Internet-wide scans to separate industrial from non-industrial ICS traffic. We provide an in-depth view on Internet-wide ICS communication. Our results can be used i) to create precise filters for potentially harmful non-industrial ICS traffic, and ii) to detect ICS sending unprotected inter-domain ICS traffic, being vulnerable to eavesdropping and traffic manipulation attacks.
A massive current research effort focuses on combining pre-existing Intranets of Things into one Internet of Things. However, this unification is not a panacea; it will expose new attack surfaces and vectors, just as it enables new applications. We therefore urgently need a model of security in the Internet of Things. In this regard, we note that IoT descends directly from pre-existing research (in embedded Internet and pervasive intelligence), so there exist several bodies of related work: security in RFID, sensor networks, cyber-physical systems, and so on. In this paper, we survey the existing literature on RFID and WSN security, as a step to compiling all known attacks and defenses relevant to the Internet of Things.
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