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Register a new userBarracuda: The Power of $ell$-polling in Proof-of-Stake Blockchains
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Added by
Ranvir Rana
Publication date
2019
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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A blockchain is a database of sequential events that is maintained by a distributed group of nodes. A key consensus problem in blockchains is that of determining the next block (data element) in the sequence. Many blockchains address this by electing a new node to propose each new block. The new block is (typically) appended to the tip of the proposers local blockchain, and subsequently broadcast to the rest of the network. Without network delay (or adversarial behavior), this procedure would give a perfect chain, since each proposer would have the same view of the blockchain. A major challenge in practice is forking. Due to network delays, a proposer may not yet have the most recent block, and may, therefore, create a side chain that branches from the middle of the main chain. Forking reduces throughput, since only one a single main chain can survive, and all other blocks are discarded. We propose a new P2P protocol for blockchains called Barracuda, in which each proposer, prior to proposing a block, polls $ell$ other nodes for their local blocktree information. Under a stochastic network model, we prove that this lightweight primitive improves throughput as if the entire network were a factor of $ell$ faster. We provide guidelines on how to implement Barracuda in practice, guaranteeing robustness against several real-world factors.
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The blockchain data structure maintained via the longest-chain rule---popularized by Bitcoin---is a powerful algorithmic tool for consensus algorithms. Such algorithms achieve consistency for blocks in the chain as a function of their depth from the end of the chain. While the analysis of Bitcoin guarantees consistency with error $2^{-k}$ for blocks of depth $O(k)$, the state-of-the-art of proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains suffers from a quadratic dependence on $k$: these protocols, exemplified by Ouroboros (Crypto 2017), Ouroboros Praos (Eurocrypt 2018) and Sleepy Consensus (Asiacrypt 2017), can only establish that depth $Theta(k^2)$ is sufficient. Whether this quadratic gap is an intrinsic limitation of PoS---due to issues such as the nothing-at-stake problem---has been an urgent open question, as deployed PoS blockchains further rely on consistency for protocol correctness. We give an axiomatic theory of blockchain dynamics that permits rigorous reasoning about the longest-chain rule and achieve, in broad generality, $Theta(k)$ dependence on depth in order to achieve consistency error $2^{-k}$. In particular, for the first time, we show that PoS protocols can match proof-of-work protocols for linear consistency. We analyze the associated stochastic process, give a recursive relation for the critical functionals of this process, and derive tail bounds in both i.i.d. and martingale settings via associated generating functions.
Designing an efficient difficulty control algorithm is an essential problem in Proof-of-Work (PoW) based blockchains because the network hash rate is randomly changing. This paper proposes a general difficulty control algorithm and provides insights for difficulty adjustment rules for PoW based blockchains. The proposed algorithm consists a two-layer neural network. It has low memory cost, meanwhile satisfying the fast-updating and low volatility requirements for difficulty adjustment. Real data from Ethereum are used in the simulations to prove that the proposed algorithm has better performance for the control of the block difficulty.
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