No Arabic abstract
Modeling social interactions based on individual behavior has always been an area of interest, but prior literature generally presumes rational behavior. Thus, such models may miss out on capturing the effects of biases humans are susceptible to. This work presents a method to model egocentric bias, the real-life tendency to emphasize ones own opinion heavily when presented with multiple opinions. We use a symmetric distribution centered at an agents own opinion, as opposed to the Bounded Confidence (BC) model used in prior work. We consider a game of iterated interactions where an agent cooperates based on its opinion about an opponent. Our model also includes the concept of domain-based self-doubt, which varies as the interaction succeeds or not. An increase in doubt makes an agent reduce its egocentricity in subsequent interactions, thus enabling the agent to learn reactively. The agent system is modeled with factions not having a single leader, to overcome some of the issues associated with leader-follower factions. We find that agents belonging to factions perform better than individual agents. We observe that an intermediate level of egocentricity helps the agent perform at its best, which concurs with conventional wisdom that neither overconfidence nor low self-esteem brings benefits.
Present bias, the tendency to weigh costs and benefits incurred in the present too heavily, is one of the most widespread human behavioral biases. It has also been the subject of extensive study in the behavioral economics literature. While the simplest models assume that the agents are naive, reasoning about the future without taking their bias into account, there is considerable evidence that people often behave in ways that are sophisticated with respect to present bias, making plans based on the belief that they will be present-biased in the future. For example, committing to a course of action to reduce future opportunities for procrastination or overconsumption are instances of sophisticated behavior in everyday life. Models of sophisticated behavior have lacked an underlying formalism that allows one to reason over the full space of multi-step tasks that a sophisticated agent might face. This has made it correspondingly difficult to make comparative or worst-case statements about the performance of sophisticated agents in arbitrary scenarios. In this paper, we incorporate the notion of sophistication into a graph-theoretic model that we used in recent work for modeling naive agents. This new synthesis of two formalisms - sophistication and graph-theoretic planning - uncovers a rich structure that wasnt apparent in the earlier behavioral economics work on this problem. In particular, our graph-theoretic model makes two kinds of new results possible. First, we give tight worst-case bounds on the performance of sophisticated agents in arbitrary multi-step tasks relative to the optimal plan. Second, the flexibility of our formalism makes it possible to identify new phenomena that had not been seen in prior literature: these include a surprising non-monotonic property in the use of rewards to motivate sophisticated agents and a framework for reasoning about commitment devices.
We present a new method to localize a camera within a previously unseen environment perceived from an egocentric point of view. Although this is, in general, an ill-posed problem, humans can effortlessly and efficiently determine their relative location and orientation and navigate into a previously unseen environments, e.g., finding a specific item in a new grocery store. To enable such a capability, we design a new egocentric representation, which we call ECO (Egocentric COgnitive map). ECO is biologically inspired, by the cognitive map that allows human navigation, and it encodes the surrounding visual semantics with respect to both distance and orientation. ECO possesses three main properties: (1) reconfigurability: complex semantics and geometry is captured via the synthesis of atomic visual representations (e.g., image patch); (2) robustness: the visual semantics are registered in a geometrically consistent way (e.g., aligning with respect to the gravity vector, frontalizing, and rescaling to canonical depth), thus enabling us to learn meaningful atomic representations; (3) adaptability: a domain adaptation framework is designed to generalize the learned representation without manual calibration. As a proof-of-concept, we use ECO to localize a camera within real-world scenes---various grocery stores---and demonstrate performance improvements when compared to existing semantic localization approaches.
Evidence-based reasoning is at the core of many problem-solving and decision-making tasks in a wide variety of domains. Generalizing from the research and development of cognitive agents in several such domains, this paper presents progress toward a computational theory for the development of instructable cognitive agents for evidence-based reasoning tasks. The paper also illustrates the application of this theory to the development of four prototype cognitive agents in domains that are critical to the government and the public sector. Two agents function as cognitive assistants, one in intelligence analysis, and the other in science education. The other two agents operate autonomously, one in cybersecurity and the other in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The paper concludes with the directions of future research on the proposed computational theory.
Reinforcement learning (RL) agents in human-computer interactions applications require repeated user interactions before they can perform well. To address this cold start problem, we propose a novel approach of using cognitive models to pre-train RL agents before they are applied to real users. After briefly reviewing relevant cognitive models, we present our general methodological approach, followed by two case studies from our previous and ongoing projects. We hope this position paper stimulates conversations between RL, HCI, and cognitive science researchers in order to explore the full potential of the approach.
Memory-based meta-learning is a powerful technique to build agents that adapt fast to any task within a target distribution. A previous theoretical study has argued that this remarkable performance is because the meta-training protocol incentivises agents to behave Bayes-optimally. We empirically investigate this claim on a number of prediction and bandit tasks. Inspired by ideas from theoretical computer science, we show that meta-learned and Bayes-optimal agents not only behave alike, but they even share a similar computational structure, in the sense that one agent system can approximately simulate the other. Furthermore, we show that Bayes-optimal agents are fixed points of the meta-learning dynamics. Our results suggest that memory-based meta-learning might serve as a general technique for numerically approximating Bayes-optimal agents - that is, even for task distributions for which we currently dont possess tractable models.