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Register a new userTowards Attack-Tolerant Networks: Concurrent Multipath Routing and the Butterfly Network
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Added by
Edward L Platt
Publication date
2017
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Targeted attacks against network infrastructure are notoriously difficult to guard against. In the case of communication networks, such attacks can leave users vulnerable to censorship and surveillance, even when cryptography is used. Much of the existing work on network fault-tolerance focuses on random faults and does not apply to adversarial faults (attacks). Centralized networks have single points of failure by definition, leading to a growing popularity in decentralized architectures and protocols for greater fault-tolerance. However, centralized network structure can arise even when protocols are decentralized. Despite their decentralized protocols, the Internet and World-Wide Web have been shown both theoretically and historically to be highly susceptible to attack, in part due to emergent structural centralization. When single points of failure exist, they are potentially vulnerable to non-technological (i.e., coercive) attacks, suggesting the importance of a structural approach to attack-tolerance. We show how the assumption of partial trust transitivity, while more realistic than the assumption underlying webs of trust, can be used to quantify the effective redundancy of a network as a function of trust transitivity. We also prove that the effective redundancy of the wrap-around butterfly topology increases exponentially with trust transitivity and describe a novel concurrent multipath routing algorithm for constructing paths to utilize that redundancy. When portions of network structure can be dictated our results can be used to create scalable, attack-tolerant infrastructures. More generally, our results provide a theoretical formalism for evaluating the effects of network structure on adversarial fault-tolerance.
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`Anytime, Anywhere data access model has become a widespread IT policy in organizations making insider attacks even more complicated to model, predict and deter. Here, we propose Gargoyle, a network-based insider attack resilient framework against the most complex insider threats within a pervasive computing context. Compared to existing solutions, Gargoyle evaluates the trustworthiness of an access request context through a new set of contextual attributes called Network Context Attribute (NCA). NCAs are extracted from the network traffic and include information such as the users device capabilities, security-level, current and prior interactions with other devices, network connection status, and suspicious online activities. Retrieving such information from the users device and its integrated sensors are challenging in terms of device performance overheads, sensor costs, availability, reliability and trustworthiness. To address these issues, Gargoyle leverages the capabilities of Software-Defined Network (SDN) for both policy enforcement and implementation. In fact, Gargoyles SDN App can interact with the network controller to create a `defence-in-depth protection system. For instance, Gargoyle can automatically quarantine a suspicious data requestor in the enterprise network for further investigation or filter out an access request before engaging a data provider. Finally, instead of employing simplistic binary rules in access authorizations, Gargoyle incorporates Function-based Access Control (FBAC) and supports the customization of access policies into a set of functions (e.g., disabling copy, allowing print) depending on the perceived trustworthiness of the context.
In wireless systems, neighbor discovery (ND) is a fundamental building block: determining which devices are within direct radio communication is an enabler for networking protocols and a wide range of applications. To thwart abuse of ND and the resultant compromise of the dependent functionality of wireless systems, numerous works proposed solutions to secure ND. Nonetheless, until very recently, there has been no formal analysis of secure ND protocols. We close this gap in cite{asiaccs08}, but we concentrate primarily on the derivation of an impossibility result for a class of protocols. In this paper, we focus on reasoning about specific protocols. First, we contribute a number of extensions and refinements on the framework of [24]. As we are particularly concerned with the practicality of provably secure ND protocols, we investigate availability and redefine accordingly the ND specification, and also consider composability of ND with other protocols. Then, we propose and analyze two secure ND protocols: We revisit one of the protocols analyzed in [24], and introduce and prove correct a more elaborate challenge-response protocol.
System noise can negatively impact the performance of HPC systems, and the interconnection network is one of the main factors contributing to this problem. To mitigate this effect, adaptive routing sends packets on non-minimal paths if they are less congested. However, while this may mitigate interference caused by congestion, it also generates more traffic since packets traverse additional hops, causing in turn congestion on other applications and on the application itself. In this paper, we first describe how to estimate network noise. By following these guidelines, we show how noise can be reduced by using routing algorithms which select minimal paths with a higher probability. We exploit this knowledge to design an algorithm which changes the probability of selecting minimal paths according to the application characteristics. We validate our solution on microbenchmarks and real-world applications on two systems relying on a Dragonfly interconnection network, showing noise reduction and performance improvement.
Future communication networks such as 5G are expected to support end-to-end delivery of services for several vertical markets with diverging requirements. Network slicing is a key construct that is used to provide end to end logical virtual networks running on a common virtualised infrastructure, which are mutually isolated. Having different network slices operating over the same 5G infrastructure creates several challenges in security and trust. This paper addresses the fundamental issue of trust of a network slice. It presents a trust model and property-based trust attestation mechanisms which can be used to evaluate the trust of the virtual network functions that compose the network slice. The proposed model helps to determine the trust of the virtual network functions as well as the properties that should be satisfied by the virtual platforms (both at boot and run time) on which these network functions are deployed for them to be trusted. We present a logic-based language that defines simple rules for the specification of properties and the conditions under which these properties are evaluated to be satisfied for trusted virtualised platforms. The proposed trust model and mechanisms enable the service providers to determine the trustworthiness of the network services as well as the users to develop trustworthy applications. .
BGP-Multipath (BGP-M) is a multipath routing technique for load balancing. Distinct from other techniques deployed at a router inside an Autonomous System (AS), BGP-M is deployed at a border router that has installed multiple inter-domain border links to a neighbour AS. It uses the equal-cost multi-path (ECMP) function of a border router to share traffic to a destination prefix on different border links. Despite recent research interests in multipath routing, there is little study on BGP-M. Here we provide the first measurement and a comprehensive analysis of BGP-M routing in the Internet. We extracted information on BGP-M from query data collected from Looking Glass (LG) servers. We revealed that BGP-M has already been extensively deployed and used in the Internet. A particular example is Hurricane Electric (AS6939), a Tier-1 network operator, which has implemented >1,000 cases of BGP-M at 69 of its border routers to prefixes in 611 of its neighbour ASes, including many hyper-giant ASes and large content providers, on both IPv4 and IPv6 Internet. We examined the distribution and operation of BGP-M. We also ran traceroute using RIPE Atlas to infer the routing paths, the schemes of traffic allocation, and the delay on border links. This study provided the state-of-the-art knowledge on BGP-M with novel insights into the unique features and the distinct advantages of BGP-M as an effective and readily available technique for load balancing.
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