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Register a new userSide-Channel Attack Resilience through Route Randomisation in Secure Real-Time Networks-on-Chip
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Added by
Leandro Indrusiak
Publication date
2016
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Security can be seen as an optimisation objective in NoC resource management, and as such poses trade-offs against other objectives such as real-time schedulability. In this paper, we show how to increase NoC resilience against a concrete type of security attack, named side-channel attack, which exploit the correlation between specific non-functional properties (such as packet latencies and routes, in the case of NoCs) to infer the functional behaviour of secure applications. For instance, the transmission of a packet over a given link of the NoC may hint on a cache miss, which can be used by an attacker to guess specific parts of a secret cryptographic key, effectively weakening it. We therefore propose packet route randomisation as a mechanism to increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks, focusing specifically on the potential impact of such an approach upon hard real-time systems, where schedulability is a vital design requirement. Using an evolutionary optimisation approach, we show how to effectively apply route randomisation in such a way that it can increase NoC security while controlling its impact on hard real-time performance guarantees. Extensive experimental evidence based on analytical and simulation models supports our findings.
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This paper proposes an upgraded electro-magnetic side-channel attack that automatically reconstructs the intercepted data. A novel system is introduced, running in parallel with leakage signal interception and catching compromising data in real-time. Based on deep learning and character recognition the proposed system retrieves more than 57% of characters present in intercepted signals regardless of signal type: analog or digital. The approach is also extended to a protection system that triggers an alarm if the system is compromised, demonstrating a success rate over 95%. Based on software-defined radio and graphics processing unit architectures, this solution can be easily deployed onto existing information systems where information shall be kept secret.
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In the fifth-generation (5G) networks and the beyond, communication latency and network bandwidth will be no more bottleneck to mobile users. Thus, almost every mobile device can participate in the distributed learning. That is, the availability issue of distributed learning can be eliminated. However, the model safety will become a challenge. This is because the distributed learning system is prone to suffering from byzantine attacks during the stages of updating model parameters and aggregating gradients amongst multiple learning participants. Therefore, to provide the byzantine-resilience for distributed learning in 5G era, this article proposes a secure computing framework based on the sharding-technique of blockchain, namely PIRATE. A case-study shows how the proposed PIRATE contributes to the distributed learning. Finally, we also envision some open issues and challenges based on the proposed byzantine-resilient learning framework.
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