No Arabic abstract
We describe generalized running key ciphers and apply them for analysis of two Shannons methods. In particular, we suggest some estimation of the cipher equivocation and the probability of correct deciphering without key.
Elaborate protocols in Secure Multi-party Computation enable several participants to compute a public function of their own private inputs while ensuring that no undesired information leaks about the private inputs, and without resorting to any trusted third party. However, the public output of the computation inevitably leaks some information about the private inputs. Recent works have introduced a framework and proposed some techniques for quantifying such information flow. Yet, owing to their complexity, those methods do not scale to practical situations that may involve large input spaces. The main contribution of the work reported here is to formally investigate the information flow captured by the min-entropy in the particular case of secure three-party computations of affine functions in order to make its quantification scalable to realistic scenarios. To this end, we mathematically derive an explicit formula for this entropy under uniform prior beliefs about the inputs. We show that this closed-form expression can be computed in time constant in the inputs sizes and logarithmic in the coefficients of the affine function. Finally, we formulate some theoretical bounds for this privacy leak in the presence of non-uniform prior beliefs.
How to enhance the communication efficiency and quality on vehicular networks is one critical important issue. While with the larger and larger scale of vehicular networks in dense cities, the real-world datasets show that the vehicular networks essentially belong to the complex network model. Meanwhile, the extensive research on complex networks has shown that the complex network theory can both provide an accurate network illustration model and further make great contributions to the network design, optimization and management. In this paper, we start with analyzing characteristics of a taxi GPS dataset and then establishing the vehicular-to-infrastructure, vehicle-to-vehicle and the hybrid communication model, respectively. Moreover, we propose a clustering algorithm for station selection, a traffic allocation optimization model and an information source selection model based on the communication performances and complex network theory.
The advances of the Internet of Things (IoT) have had a fundamental impact and influence in sharping our rich living experiences. However, since IoT devices are usually resource-constrained, lightweight block ciphers have played a major role in serving as a building block for secure IoT protocols. In CHES 2015, SIMECK, a family of block ciphers, was designed for resource-constrained IoT devices. Since its publication, there have been many analyses on its security. In this paper, under the one bit-flip model, we propose a new efficient fault analysis attack on SIMECK ciphers. Compared to those previously reported attacks, our attack can recover the full master key by injecting faults into only a single round of all SIMECK family members. This property is crucial, as it is infeasible for an attacker to inject faults into different rounds of a SIMECK implementation on IoT devices in the real world. Specifically, our attack is characterized by exercising a deep analysis of differential trail between the correct and faulty immediate ciphertexts. Extensive simulation evaluations are conducted, and the results demonstrate the effectiveness and correctness of our proposed attack.
This article serves as a brief introduction to the Shannon information theory. Concepts of information, Shannon entropy and channel capacity are mainly covered. All these concepts are developed in a totally combinatorial flavor. Some issues usually not addressed in the literature are discussed here as well. In particular, we show that it seems we can define channel capacity differently which allows us to potentially transmit more messages in a fixed sufficient long time duration. However, for a channel carrying a finite number of letters, the channel capacity unfortunately remains the same as the Shannon limit.
Since their introduction over two decades ago, side-channel attacks have presented a serious security threat. While many ciphers implementations employ masking techniques to protect against such attacks, they often leak secret information due to unintended interactions in the hardware. We present Rosita, a code rewrite engine that uses a leakage emulator which we amend to correctly emulate the micro-architecture of a target system. We use Rosita to automatically protect masked implementations of AES, ChaCha, and Xoodoo. For AES and Xoodoo, we show the absence of observable leakage at 1,000,000 traces with less than 21% penalty to the performance. For ChaCha, which has significantly more leakage, Rosita eliminates over 99% of the leakage, at a performance cost of 64%.