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Register a new userSingle-shot security for one-time memories in the isolated qubits model
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Yi-Kai Liu
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One-time memories (OTMs) are simple, tamper-resistant cryptographic devices, which can be used to implement sophisticated functionalities such as one-time programs. Can one construct OTMs whose security follows from some physical principle? This is not possible in a fully-classical world, or in a fully-quantum world, but there is evidence that OTMs can be built using isolated qubits -- qubits that cannot be entangled, but can be accessed using adaptive sequences of single-qubit measurements. Here we present new constructions for OTMs using isolated qubits, which improve on previous work in several respects: they achieve a stronger single-shot security guarantee, which is stated in terms of the (smoothed) min-entropy; they are proven secure against adversaries who can perform arbitrary local operations and classical communication (LOCC); and they are efficiently implementable. These results use Wiesners idea of conjugate coding, combined with error-correcting codes that approach the capacity of the q-ary symmetric channel, and a high-order entropic uncertainty relation, which was originally developed for cryptography in the bounded quantum storage model.
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One-time memories (OTMs) are simple tamper-resistant cryptographic devices, which can be used to implement one-time programs, a very general form of software protection and program obfuscation. Here we investigate the possibility of building OTMs using quantum mechanical devices. It is known that OTMs cannot exist in a fully-quantum world or in a fully-classical world. Instead, we propose a new model based on isolated qubits -- qubits that can only be accessed using local operations and classical communication (LOCC). This model combines a quantum resource (single-qubit measurements) with a classical restriction (on communication between qubits), and can be implemented using current technologies, such as nitrogen vacancy centers in diamond. In this model, we construct OTMs that are information-theoretically secure against one-pass LOCC adversaries that use 2-outcome measurements. Our construction resembles Wiesners old idea of quantum conjugate coding, implemented using random error-correcting codes; our proof of security uses entropy chaining to bound the supremum of a suitable empirical process. In addition, we conjecture that our random codes can be replaced by some class of efficiently-decodable codes, to get computationally-efficient OTMs that are secure against computationally-bounded LOCC adversaries. In addition, we construct data-hiding states, which allow an LOCC sender to encode an (n-O(1))-bit messsage into n qubits, such that at most half of the message can be extracted by a one-pass LOCC receiver, but the whole message can be extracted by a general quantum receiver.
Quantum-access security, where an attacker is granted superposition access to secret-keyed functionalities, is a fundamental security model and its study has inspired results in post-quantum security. We revisit, and fill a gap in, the quantum-access security analysis of the Lamport one-time signature scheme (OTS) in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) by Alagic et al.~(Eurocrypt 2020). We then go on to generalize the technique to the Winternitz OTS. Along the way, we develop a tool for the analysis of hash chains in the QROM based on the superposition oracle technique by Zhandry (Crypto 2019) which might be of independent interest.
Isolated qubits are a special class of quantum devices, which can be used to implement tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware such as one-time memories (OTMs). Unfortunately, these OTM constructions leak some information, and standard methods for privacy amplification cannot be applied here, because the adversary has advance knowledge of the hash function that the honest parties will use. In this paper we show a stronger form of privacy amplification that solves this problem, using a fixed hash function that is secure against all possible adversaries in the isolated qubits model. This allows us to construct single-bit OTMs which only leak an exponentially small amount of information. We then study a natural generalization of the isolated qubits model, where the adversary is allowed to perform a polynomially-bounded number of entangling gates, in addition to unbounded local operations and classical communication (LOCC). We show that our technique for privacy amplification is also secure in this setting.
We prove the security of theoretical quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of classical and quantum physics. A key created that way can then be used to transmit secure messages such that their security is also unaffected in the future.
One-time programs are modelled after a black box that allows a single evaluation of a function, and then self-destructs. Because software can, in principle, be copied, general one-time programs exists only in the hardware token model: it has been shown that any function admits a one-time program as long as we assume access to physical devices called one-time memories. Quantum information, with its well-known property of no-cloning, would, at first glance, prevent the basic copying attack for classical programs. We show that this intuition is false: one-time programs for both classical and quantum maps, based solely on quantum information, do not exist, even with computational assumptions. We complement this strong impossibility proof by an equally strong possibility result: assuming the same basic one-time memories as used for classical one-time programs, we show that every quantum map has a quantum one-time program that is secure in the universal composability framework. Our construction relies on a new, simpler quantum authentication scheme and corresponding mechanism for computing on authenticated data.
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