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Register a new userSeeking Anonymity in an Internet Panopticon
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Added by
Bryan Ford
Publication date
2013
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Obtaining and maintaining anonymity on the Internet is challenging. The state of the art in deployed tools, such as Tor, uses onion routing (OR) to relay encrypted connections on a detour passing through randomly chosen relays scattered around the Internet. Unfortunately, OR is known to be vulnerable at least in principle to several classes of attacks for which no solution is known or believed to be forthcoming soon. Current approaches to anonymity also appear unable to offer accurate, principled measurement of the level or quality of anonymity a user might obtain. Toward this end, we offer a high-level view of the Dissent project, the first systematic effort to build a practical anonymity system based purely on foundations that offer measurable and formally provable anonymity properties. Dissent builds on two key pre-existing primitives - verifiable shuffles and dining cryptographers - but for the first time shows how to scale such techniques to offer measurable anonymity guarantees to thousands of participants. Further, Dissent represents the first anonymity system designed from the ground up to incorporate some systematic countermeasure for each of the major classes of known vulnerabilities in existing approaches, including global traffic analysis, active attacks, and intersection attacks. Finally, because no anonymity protocol alone can address risks such as software exploits or accidental self-identification, we introduce WiNon, an experimental operating system architecture to harden the uses of anonymity tools such as Tor and Dissent against such attacks.
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In this paper, we present an epistemic logic approach to the compositionality of several privacy-related informationhiding/ disclosure properties. The properties considered here are anonymity, privacy, onymity, and identity. Our initial observation reveals that anonymity and privacy are not necessarily sequentially compositional; this means that even though a system comprising several sequential phases satisfies a certain unlinkability property in each phase, the entire system does not always enjoy a desired unlinkability property. We show that the compositionality can be guaranteed provided that the phases of the system satisfy what we call the independence assumptions. More specifically, we develop a series of theoretical case studies of what assumptions are sufficient to guarantee the sequential compositionality of various degrees of anonymity, privacy, onymity, and/or identity properties. Similar results for parallel composition are also discussed.
Atom is an anonymous messaging system that protects against traffic-analysis attacks. Unlike many prior systems, each Atom server touches only a small fraction of the total messages routed through the network. As a result, the systems capacity scales near-linearly with the number of servers. At the same time, each Atom user benefits from best possible anonymity: a user is anonymous among all honest users of the system, against an active adversary who controls the entire network, a portion of the systems servers, and any number of malicious users. The architectural ideas behind Atom have been known in theory, but putting them into practice requires new techniques for (1) avoiding the reliance on heavy general-purpose multi-party computation protocols, (2) defeating active attacks by malicious servers at minimal performance cost, and (3) handling server failure and churn. Atom is most suitable for sending a large number of short messages, as in a microblogging application or a high-security communication bootstrapping (dialing) for private messaging systems. We show that, on a heterogeneous network of 1,024 servers, Atom can transit a million Tweet-length messages in 28 minutes. This is over 23x faster than prior systems with similar privacy guarantees.
Organizational networks are vulnerable to traffic-analysis attacks that enable adversaries to infer sensitive information from the network traffic - even if encryption is used. Typical anonymous communication networks are tailored to the Internet and are poorly suited for organizational networks. We present PriFi, an anonymous communication protocol for LANs, which protects users against eavesdroppers and provides high-performance traffic-analysis resistance. PriFi builds on Dining Cryptographers networks but reduces the high communication latency of prior work via a new client/relay/server architecture, in which a clients packets remain on their usual network path without additional hops, and in which a set of remote servers assist the anonymization process without adding latency. PriFi also solves the challenge of equivocation attacks, which are not addressed by related works, by encrypting the traffic based on the communication history. Our evaluation shows that PriFi introduces a small latency overhead (~100ms for 100 clients) and is compatible with delay-sensitive applications such as VoIP.
Anonymity networks are becoming increasingly popular in todays online world as more users attempt to safeguard their online privacy. Tor is currently the most popular anonymity network in use and provides anonymity to both users and services (hidden services). However, the anonymity provided by Tor is also being misused in various ways. Hosting illegal sites for selling drugs, hosting command and control servers for botnets, and distributing censored content are but a few such examples. As a result, various parties, including governments and law enforcement agencies, are interested in attacks that assist in de-anonymising the Tor network, disrupting its operations, and bypassing its censorship circumvention mechanisms. In this paper, we survey known Tor attacks and identify currently available techniques that lead to improved de-anonymisation of users and hidden services.
Anonymity has become a significant issue in security field by recent advances in information technology and internet. The main objective of anonymity is hiding and concealing entities privacy inside a system. Many methods and protocols have been proposed with different anonymity services to provide anonymity requirements in various fields until now. Each anonymity method or protocol is developed using particular approach. In this paper, first, accurate and perfect definitions of privacy and anonymity are presented then most important problems in anonymity field are investigated. Afterwards, the numbers of main anonymity protocols are described with necessary details. Finally, all findings are concluded and some more future perspectives are discussed.
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