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Register a new userPDL as a Multi-Agent Strategy Logic
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Added by
Burkhard C. Schipper
Publication date
2013
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
Authors
Jan van Eijck
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Propositional Dynamic Logic or PDL was invented as a logic for reasoning about regular programming constructs. We propose a new perspective on PDL as a multi-agent strategic logic (MASL). This logic for strategic reasoning has group strategies as first class citizens, and brings game logic closer to standard modal logic. We demonstrate that MASL can express key notions of game theory, social choice theory and voting theory in a natural way, we give a sound and complete proof system for MASL, and we show that MASL encodes coalition logic. Next, we extend the language to epistemic multi-agent strategic logic (EMASL), we give examples of what it can express, we propose to use it for posing new questions in epistemic social choice theory, and we give a calculus for reasoning about a natural class of epistemic game models. We end by listing avenues for future research and by tracing connections to a number of other logics for reasoning about strategies.
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