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Register a new userA Classification of Weakly Acyclic Games
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Added by
Krzysztof R. Apt
Publication date
2012
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Weakly acyclic games form a natural generalization of the class of games that have the finite improvement property (FIP). In such games one stipulates that from any initial joint strategy some finite improvement path exists. We classify weakly acyclic games using the concept of a scheduler introduced in arXiv:1202.2209. We also show that finite games that can be solved by the iterated elimination of never best response strategies are weakly acyclic. Finally, we explain how the schedulers allow us to improve the bounds on finding a Nash equilibrium in a weakly acyclic game.
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