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Register a new userRange-based attacks on links in random scale-free networks
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$Range$ and $load$ play keys on the problem of attacking on links in random scale-free (RSF) networks. In this Brief Report we obtain the relation between $range$ and $load$ in RSF networks analytically by the generating function theory, and then give an estimation about the impact of attacks on the $efficiency$ of the network. The analytical results show that short range attacks are more destructive for RSF networks, and are confirmed numerically. Further our results are consistent with the former literature (Physical Review E textbf{66}, 065103(R) (2002)).
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Random walks on discrete lattices are fundamental models that form the basis for our understanding of transport and diffusion processes. For a single random walker on complex networks, many properties such as the mean first passage time and cover time are known. However, many recent applications such as search engines and recommender systems involve multiple random walkers on complex networks. In this work, based on numerical simulations, we show that the fraction of nodes of scale-free network not visited by $W$ random walkers in time $t$ has a stretched exponential form independent of the details of the network and number of walkers. This leads to a power-law relation between nodes not visited by $W$ walkers and by one walker within time $t$. The problem of finding the distinct nodes visited by $W$ walkers, effectively, can be reduced to that of a single walker. The robustness of the results is demonstrated by verifying them on four different real-world networks that approximately display scale-free structure.
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