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Register a new userExperimental Quantum Coin Tossing
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Added by
Gabriel Molina-Terriza
Publication date
2004
fields
Physics
and research's language is
English
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In this letter we present the first implementation of a quantum coin tossing protocol. This protocol belongs to a class of ``two-party cryptographic problems, where the communication partners distrust each other. As with a number of such two-party protocols, the best implementation of the quantum coin tossing requires qutrits. In this way, we have also performed the first complete quantum communication protocol with qutrits. In our experiment the two partners succeeded to remotely toss a row of coins using photons entangled in the orbital angular momentum. We also show the experimental bounds of a possible cheater and the ways of detecting him.
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The security of quantum communication using a weak coherent source requires an accurate knowledge of the sources mean photon number. Finite calibration precision or an active manipulation by an attacker may cause the actual emitted photon number to deviate from the known value. We model effects of this deviation on the security of three quantum communication protocols: the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol without decoy states, Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) QKD protocol, and a coin-tossing protocol. For QKD, we model both a strong attack using technology possible in principle, and a realistic attack bounded by todays technology. To maintain the mean photon number in two-way systems, such as plug-and-play and relativistic quantum cryptography schemes, bright pulse energy incoming from the communication channel must be monitored. Implementation of a monitoring detector has largely been ignored so far, except for ID Quantiques commercial QKD system Clavis2. We scrutinize this implementation for security problems, and show that designing a hack-proof pulse-energy-measuring detector is far from trivial. Indeed the first implementation has three serious flaws confirmed experimentally, each of which may be exploited in a cleverly constructed Trojan-horse attack. We discuss requirements for a loophole-free implementation of the monitoring detector.
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