No Arabic abstract
Recent studies demonstrated the vulnerability of control policies learned through deep reinforcement learning against adversarial attacks, raising concerns about the application of such models to risk-sensitive tasks such as autonomous driving. Threat models for these demonstrations are limited to (1) targeted attacks through real-time manipulation of the agents observation, and (2) untargeted attacks through manipulation of the physical environment. The former assumes full access to the agents states/observations at all times, while the latter has no control over attack outcomes. This paper investigates the feasibility of targeted attacks through visually learned patterns placed on physical object in the environment, a threat model that combines the practicality and effectiveness of the existing ones. Through analysis, we demonstrate that a pre-trained policy can be hijacked within a time window, e.g., performing an unintended self-parking, when an adversarial object is present. To enable the attack, we adopt an assumption that the dynamics of both the environment and the agent can be learned by the attacker. Lastly, we empirically show the effectiveness of the proposed attack on different driving scenarios, perform a location robustness test, and study the tradeoff between the attack strength and its effectiveness.
With the development of deep representation learning, the domain of reinforcement learning (RL) has become a powerful learning framework now capable of learning complex policies in high dimensional environments. This review summarises deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithms and provides a taxonomy of automated driving tasks where (D)RL methods have been employed, while addressing key computational challenges in real world deployment of autonomous driving agents. It also delineates adjacent domains such as behavior cloning, imitation learning, inverse reinforcement learning that are related but are not classical RL algorithms. The role of simulators in training agents, methods to validate, test and robustify existing solutions in RL are discussed.
Safety remains a central obstacle preventing widespread use of RL in the real world: learning new tasks in uncertain environments requires extensive exploration, but safety requires limiting exploration. We propose Recovery RL, an algorithm which navigates this tradeoff by (1) leveraging offline data to learn about constraint violating zones before policy learning and (2) separating the goals of improving task performance and constraint satisfaction across two policies: a task policy that only optimizes the task reward and a recovery policy that guides the agent to safety when constraint violation is likely. We evaluate Recovery RL on 6 simulation domains, including two contact-rich manipulation tasks and an image-based navigation task, and an image-based obstacle avoidance task on a physical robot. We compare Recovery RL to 5 prior safe RL methods which jointly optimize for task performance and safety via constrained optimization or reward shaping and find that Recovery RL outperforms the next best prior method across all domains. Results suggest that Recovery RL trades off constraint violations and task successes 2 - 20 times more efficiently in simulation domains and 3 times more efficiently in physical experiments. See https://tinyurl.com/rl-recovery for videos and supplementary material.
Deep learning-based time series models are being extensively utilized in engineering and manufacturing industries for process control and optimization, asset monitoring, diagnostic and predictive maintenance. These models have shown great improvement in the prediction of the remaining useful life (RUL) of industrial equipment but suffer from inherent vulnerability to adversarial attacks. These attacks can be easily exploited and can lead to catastrophic failure of critical industrial equipment. In general, different adversarial perturbations are computed for each instance of the input data. This is, however, difficult for the attacker to achieve in real time due to higher computational requirement and lack of uninterrupted access to the input data. Hence, we present the concept of universal adversarial perturbation, a special imperceptible noise to fool regression based RUL prediction models. Attackers can easily utilize universal adversarial perturbations for real-time attack since continuous access to input data and repetitive computation of adversarial perturbations are not a prerequisite for the same. We evaluate the effect of universal adversarial attacks using NASA turbofan engine dataset. We show that addition of universal adversarial perturbation to any instance of the input data increases error in the output predicted by the model. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the effect of the universal adversarial perturbation on time series regression models. We further demonstrate the effect of varying the strength of perturbations on RUL prediction models and found that model accuracy decreases with the increase in perturbation strength of the universal adversarial attack. We also showcase that universal adversarial perturbation can be transferred across different models.
In Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), one fundamental pillar is perception, which leverages sensors like cameras and LiDARs (Light Detection and Ranging) to understand the driving environment. Due to its direct impact on road safety, multiple prior efforts have been made to study its the security of perception systems. In contrast to prior work that concentrates on camera-based perception, in this work we perform the first security study of LiDAR-based perception in AV settings, which is highly important but unexplored. We consider LiDAR spoofing attacks as the threat model and set the attack goal as spoofing obstacles close to the front of a victim AV. We find that blindly applying LiDAR spoofing is insufficient to achieve this goal due to the machine learning-based object detection process. Thus, we then explore the possibility of strategically controlling the spoofed attack to fool the machine learning model. We formulate this task as an optimization problem and design modeling methods for the input perturbation function and the objective function. We also identify the inherent limitations of directly solving the problem using optimization and design an algorithm that combines optimization and global sampling, which improves the attack success rates to around 75%. As a case study to understand the attack impact at the AV driving decision level, we construct and evaluate two attack scenarios that may damage road safety and mobility. We also discuss defense directions at the AV system, sensor, and machine learning model levels.
The deep hashing based retrieval method is widely adopted in large-scale image and video retrieval. However, there is little investigation on its security. In this paper, we propose a novel method, dubbed deep hashing targeted attack (DHTA), to study the targeted attack on such retrieval. Specifically, we first formulate the targeted attack as a point-to-set optimization, which minimizes the average distance between the hash code of an adversarial example and those of a set of objects with the target label. Then we design a novel component-voting scheme to obtain an anchor code as the representative of the set of hash codes of objects with the target label, whose optimality guarantee is also theoretically derived. To balance the performance and perceptibility, we propose to minimize the Hamming distance between the hash code of the adversarial example and the anchor code under the $ell^infty$ restriction on the perturbation. Extensive experiments verify that DHTA is effective in attacking both deep hashing based image retrieval and video retrieval.