There is currently a burgeoning demand for deploying deep learning (DL) models on ubiquitous edge Internet of Things devices attributing to their low latency and high privacy preservation. However, DL models are often large in size and require large-scale computation, which prevents them from being placed directly onto IoT devices where resources are constrained and 32-bit floating-point operations are unavailable. Model quantization is a pragmatic solution, which enables DL deployment on mobile devices and embedded systems by effortlessly post-quantizing a large high-precision model into a small low-precision model while retaining the model inference accuracy. This work reveals that the standard quantization operation can be abused to activate a backdoor. We demonstrate that a full-precision backdoored model that does not have any backdoor effect in the presence of a trigger -- as the backdoor is dormant -- can be activated by the default TensorFlow-Lite quantization, the only product-ready quantization framework to date. We ascertain that all trained float-32 backdoored models exhibit no backdoor effect even in the presence of trigger inputs. State-of-the-art frontend detection approaches, such as Neural Cleanse and STRIP, fail to identify the backdoor in the float-32 models. When each of the float-32 models is converted into an int-8 format model through the standard TFLite post-training quantization, the backdoor is activated in the quantized model, which shows a stable attack success rate close to 100% upon inputs with the trigger, while behaves normally upon non-trigger inputs. This work highlights that a stealthy security threat occurs when end users utilize the on-device post-training model quantization toolkits, informing security researchers of cross-platform overhaul of DL models post quantization even if they pass frontend inspections.
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