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Register a new userMoral-hazard-free insurance: mean-variance premium principle and rank-dependent utility
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Zuo Quan Xu
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This study exams a Pareto optimal insurance problem, where the insured maximizes her rank-dependent utility and the insurer employs the mean-variance premium principle. To eliminate some possible moral hazard issues, we only consider moral-hazard-free insurance contracts that obey the incentive compatibility constraint. The insurance problem is first formulated as a non-concave maximization problem involving Choquet expectation, then turned into a concave quantile optimization problem and finally solved by calculus of variations method. The optimal contract is expressed by a semi-linear second order double-obstacle ordinary differential equation with nonlocal operator. When the probability weighting function has a density, an effective numerical method is proposed to compute the optimal contract.
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This paper investigates Pareto optimal (PO, for short) insurance contracts in a behavioral finance framework, in which the insured evaluates contracts by the rank-dependent utility (RDU) theory and the insurer by the expected value premium principle. The incentive compatibility constraint is taken into account, so the contracts are free of moral hazard. The problem is initially formulated as a non-concave maximization problem involving Choquet expectation, then turned into a quantile optimization problem and tackled by calculus of variations method. The optimal contracts are expressed by a double-obstacle ordinary differential equation for a semi-linear second-order elliptic operator with nonlocal boundary conditions. We provide a simple numerical scheme as well as a numerical example to calculate the optimal contracts. Let $theta$ and $m_0$ denote the relative safety loading and the mass of the potential loss at 0. We find that every moral-hazard-free contract is optimal for infinitely many RDU insureds if $0<theta<frac{m_0}{1-m_0}$; by contrast, some contracts such as the full coverage contract are never optimal for any RDU insured if $theta>frac{m_0}{1-m_0}$. We also derive all the PO contracts when either the compensations or the retentions loss monotonicity.
We propose a model for an insurance loss index and the claims process of a single insurance company holding a fraction of the total number of contracts that captures both ordinary losses and losses due to catastrophes. In this model we price a catastrophe derivative by the method of utility indifference pricing. The associated stochastic optimization problem is treated by techniques for piecewise deterministic Markov processes. A numerical study illustrates our results.
Bernard et al. (2015) study an optimal insurance design problem where an individuals preference is of the rank-dependent utility (RDU) type, and show that in general an optimal contract covers both large and small losses. However, their contracts suffer from a problem of moral hazard for paying more compensation for a smaller loss. This paper addresses this setback by exogenously imposing the constraint that both the indemnity function and the insureds retention function be increasing with respect to the loss. We characterize the optimal solutions via calculus of variations, and then apply the result to obtain explicitly expressed contracts for problems with Yaaris dual criterion and general RDU. Finally, we use a numerical example to compare the results between ours and that of Bernard et al. (2015).
This paper considers optimal control problem of a large insurance company under a fixed insolvency probability. The company controls proportional reinsurance rate, dividend pay-outs and investing process to maximize the expected present value of the dividend pay-outs until the time of bankruptcy. This paper aims at describing the optimal return function as well as the optimal policy. As a by-product, the paper theoretically sets a risk-based capital standard to ensure the capital requirement of can cover the total risk.
We consider an optimal control problem of a property insurance company with proportional reinsurance strategy. The insurance business brings in catastrophe risk, such as earthquake and flood. The catastrophe risk could be partly reduced by reinsurance. The management of the company controls the reinsurance rate and dividend payments process to maximize the expected present value of the dividends before bankruptcy. This is the first time to consider the catastrophe risk in property insurance model, which is more realistic. We establish the solution of the problem by the mixed singular-regular control of jump diffusions. We first derive the optimal retention ratio, the optimal dividend payments level, the optimal return function and the optimal control strategy of the property insurance company, then the impacts of the catastrophe risk and key model parameters on the optimal return function and the optimal control strategy of the company are discussed.
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