No Arabic abstract
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution exploits coherent measurements of the electromagnetic field, i.e., homodyne or heterodyne detection. The most advanced security analyses developed so far relied on idealised mathematical models for such measurements, which assume that the measurement outcomes are continuous and unbounded variables. As any physical measurement device has finite range and precision, these mathematical models only serve as an approximation. It is expected that, under suitable conditions, the predictions obtained using these simplified models are in good agreement with the actual experimental implementations. However, a quantitative analysis of the error introduced by this approximation, and of its impact on composable security, have been lacking so far. Here we present a theory to rigorously account for the experimental limitations of realistic heterodyne detection. We focus on asymptotic security against collective attacks, and indicate a route to include finite-size effects.
Most quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols could be classified as either a discrete-variable (DV) protocol or continuous-variable (CV) protocol, based on how classical information is being encoded. We propose a protocol that combines the best of both worlds: the simplicity of quantum state preparation in DV protocols as well as the cost-effective and high bandwidth of homodyne detectors that are normally used in CV protocols. In addition, our protocol does not require the honest parties to share the same reference phase, in contrast to typical CV-QKD protocols. We then prove the security of the proposed protocol in the asymptotic limit under the assumption of collective attacks. Our simulation suggests that the protocol is suitable for secure and high-speed practical key distribution over short distances.
Quantum key distribution is one of the most fundamental cryptographic protocols. Quantum walks are important primitives for computing. In this paper we take advantage of the properties of quantum walks to design new secure quantum key distribution schemes. In particular, we introduce a secure quantum key-distribution protocol equipped with verification procedures against full man-in-the-middle attacks. Furthermore, we present a one-way protocol and prove its security. Finally, we propose a semi-quantum variation and prove its robustness against eavesdropping.
The ping-pong protocol adapted for quantum key distribution is studied in the trusted quantum noise scenario, wherein the legitimate parties can add noise locally. For a well-studied attack model, we show how non-unital quantum non-Markovianity of the added noise can improve the key rate. We also point out that this noise-induced advantage cannot be obtained by Alice and Bob by adding local classical noise to their post-measurement data.
This chapter describes the application of lasers, specifically diode lasers, in the area of quantum key distribution (QKD). First, we motivate the distribution of cryptographic keys based on quantum physical properties of light, give a brief introduction to QKD assuming the reader has no or very little knowledge about cryptography, and briefly present the state-of-the-art of QKD. In the second half of the chapter we describe, as an example of a real-world QKD system, the system deployed between the University of Calgary and SAIT Polytechnic. We conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of quantum networks and future steps.
We propose a new Quantum Key Distribution method in which Alice sends pairs of qubits to Bob, each in one of four possible states. Bob uses one qubit to generate a secure key and the other to generate an auxiliary key. For each pair he randomly decides which qubit to use for which key. The auxiliary key has to be added to Bobs secure key in order to match Alices secure key. This scheme provides an additional layer of security over the standard BB84 protocol.