Subscribe to the gold package and get unlimited access to Shamra Academy
Register a new userIncremental Vulnerability Detection with Insecurity Separation Logic
92
0
0.0
(
0
)
Added by
Toby Murray
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
Ask ChatGPT about the research
No Arabic abstract
We present the first compositional, incremental static analysis for detecting memory-safety and information leakage vulnerabilities in C-like programs. To do so, we develop the first under-approximate relational program logics for reasoning about information flow, including Insecurity Separation Logic (InsecSL). Like prior under-approximate separation logics, we show that InsecSL can be automated via symbolic execution. We then adapt and extend a prior intra-procedural symbolic execution algorithm to build a bottom-up, inter-procedural and incremental analysis for detecting vulnerabilities. We prove our approach sound in Isabelle/HOL and implement it in a proof-of-concept tool, Underflow, for analysing C programs, which we apply to various case studies.
rate research
Read More
We propose a formal approach for relating abstract separation logic library specifications with the trace properties they enforce on interactions between a client and a library. Separation logic with abstract predicates enforces a resource discipline that constrains when and how calls may be made between a client and a library. Intuitively, this can enforce a protocol on the interaction trace. This intuition is broadly used in the separation logic community but has not previously been formalised. We provide just such a formalisation. Our approach is based on using wrappers which instrument library code to induce execution traces for the properties under examination. By considering a separation logic extended with trace resources, we prove that when a library satisfies its separation logic specification then its wrapped version satisfies the same specification and, moreover, maintains the trace properties as an invariant. Consequently, any client and library implementation that are correct with respect to the separation logic specification will satisfy the trace properties.
We present a unification of refinement and Hoare-style reasoning in a foundational mechanized higher-order distributed separation logic. This unification enables us to prove formally in the Coq proof assistant that concrete implementations of challenging distributed systems refine more abstract models and to combine refinement-style reasoning with Hoare-style program verification. We use our logic to prove correctness of concrete implementations of two-phase commit and single-decree Paxos by showing that they refine their abstract TLA+ specifications. We further use our notion of refinement to transfer fairness assumptions on program executions to model traces and then transfer liveness properties of fair model traces back to program executions, which enables us to prove liveness properties such as strong eventual consistency of a concrete implementation of a Conflict-Free Replicated Data Type and fair termination of a concurrent program.
We define a domain-specific language (DSL) to inductively assemble flow networks from small networks or modules to produce arbitrarily large ones, with interchangeable functionally-equivalent parts. Our small networks or modules are small only as the building blocks in this inductive definition (there is no limit on their size). Associated with our DSL is a type theory, a system of formal annotations to express desirable properties of flow networks together with rules that enforce them as invariants across their interfaces, i.e, the rules guarantee the properties are preserved as we build larger networks from smaller ones. A prerequisite for a type theory is a formal semantics, i.e, a rigorous definition of the entities that qualify as feasible flows through the networks, possibly restricted to satisfy additional efficiency or safety requirements. This can be carried out in one of two ways, as a denotational semantics or as an operational (or reduction) semantics; we choose the first in preference to the second, partly to avoid exponential-growth rewriting in the operational approach. We set up a typing system and prove its soundness for our DSL.
Verification of microkernels, device drivers, and crypto routines requires analyses at the binary level. In order to automate these analyses, in the last years several binary analysis platforms have been introduced. These platforms share a common design: the adoption of hardware-independent intermediate representations, a mechanism to translate architecture dependent code to this representation, and a set of architecture independent analyses that process the intermediate representation. The usage of these platforms to verify software introduces the need for trusting both the correctness of the translation from binary code to intermediate language (called transpilation) and the correctness of the analyses. Achieving a high degree of trust is challenging since the transpilation must handle (i) all the side effects of the instructions, (ii) multiple instruction encodings (e.g. ARM Thumb), and (iii) variable instruction length (e.g. Intel). Similarly, analyses can use complex transformations (e.g. loop unrolling) and simplifications (e.g. partial evaluation) of the artifacts, whose bugs can jeopardize correctness of the results. We overcome these problems by developing a binary analysis platform on top of the interactive theorem prover HOL4. First, we formally model a binary intermediate language and we prove correctness of several supporting tools (i.e. a type checker). Then, we implement two proof-producing transpilers, which respectively translate ARMv8 and CortexM0 programs to the intermediate language and generate a certificate. This certificate is a HOL4 proof demonstrating correctness of the translation. As demonstrating analysis, we implement a proof-producing weakest precondition generator, which can be used to verify that a given loop-free program fragment satisfies a contract. Finally, we use an AES encryption implementation to benchmark our platform.
We show that noninterference and transparency, the key soundness theorems for dynamic IFC libraries, can be obtained for free, as direct consequences of the more general parametricity theorem of type abstraction. This allows us to give very short soundness proofs for dynamic IFC libraries such as faceted values and LIO. Our proofs stay short even when fully mechanized for Agda implementations of the libraries in terms of type abstraction.
Log in to be able to interact and post comments
comments
Fetching comments
Sign in to be able to follow your search criteria
