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This paper deals with design of an integrated secure Blockchain network framework to prevent damages from attackers. The multi-layer concept which could handle multiple number of networks is adapted on the top of Blockchain Governance Game frameworks. This new integrated theoretical model is designed to find the best strategies toward preparation for preventing whole network systems malfunction from attackers and it is developed based on the combination of the Blockchain Governance Game and the Strategic Alliance for Blockchain Governance Game. Analytically tractable results for executing a safety mode are fully obtained and simulated results are demonstrated to obtain the optimal values of hyper parameters of a Blockchain based security network. This research helps those whom are constructing a multiple layer network by enhancing security features through multi-layer framework in a decentralized network.
Recent advances in the blockchain research have been made in two important directions. One is refined resilience analysis utilizing game theory to study the consequences of selfish behaviors of users (miners), and the other is the extension from a linear (chain) structure to a non-linear (graphical) structure for performance improvements, such as IOTA and Graphcoin. The first question that comes to peoples minds is what improvements that a blockchain system would see by leveraging these new advances. In this paper, we consider three major metrics for a blockchain system: full verification, scalability, and finality-duration. We { establish a formal framework and} prove that no blockchain system can achieve full verification, high scalability, and low finality-duration simultaneously. We observe that classical blockchain systems like Bitcoin achieves full verification and low finality-duration, Harmony and Ethereum 2.0 achieve low finality-duration and high scalability. As a complementary, we design a non-linear blockchain system that achieves full verification and scalability. We also establish, for the first time, the trade-off between scalability and finality-duration.
This paper we define a new Puzzle called Proof-of-Interaction and we show how it can replace, in the Bitcoin protocol, the Proof-of-Work algorithm.
Bitcoin was the first successful decentralized cryptocurrency and remains the most popular of its kind to this day. Despite the benefits of its blockchain, Bitcoin still faces serious scalability issues, most importantly its ever-increasing blockchain size. While alternative designs introduced schemes to periodically create snapshots and thereafter prune older blocks, already-deployed systems such as Bitcoin are often considered incapable of adopting corresponding approaches. In this work, we revise this popular belief and present CoinPrune, a snapshot-based pruning scheme that is fully compatible with Bitcoin. CoinPrune can be deployed through an opt-in velvet fork, i.e., without impeding the established Bitcoin network. By requiring miners to publicly announce and jointly reaffirm recent snapshots on the blockchain, CoinPrune establishes trust into the snapshots correctness even in the presence of powerful adversaries. Our evaluation shows that CoinPrune reduces the storage requirements of Bitcoin already by two orders of magnitude today, with further relative savings as the blockchain grows. In our experiments, nodes only have to fetch and process 5 GiB instead of 230 GiB of data when joining the network, reducing the synchronization time on powerful devices from currently 5 h to 46 min, with even more savings for less powerful devices.
In the Internet-of-Things, the number of connected devices is expected to be extremely huge, i.e., more than a couple of ten billion. It is however well-known that the security for the Internet-of-Things is still open problem. In particular, it is difficult to certify the identification of connected devices and to prevent the illegal spoofing. It is because the conventional security technologies have advanced for mainly protecting logical network and not for physical network like the Internet-of-Things. In order to protect the Internet-of-Things with advanced security technologies, we propose a new concept (datachain layer) which is a well-designed combination of physical chip identification and blockchain. With a proposed solution of the physical chip identification, the physical addresses of connected devices are uniquely connected to the logical addresses to be protected by blockchain.
The use of the term blockchain is documented for disparate projects, from cryptocurrencies to applications for the Internet of Things (IoT), and many more. The concept of blockchain appears therefore blurred, as it is hard to believe that the same technology can empower applications that have extremely different requirements and exhibit dissimilar performance and security. This position paper elaborates on the theory of distributed systems to advance a clear definition of blockchain that allows us to clarify its role in the IoT. This definition inextricably binds together three elements that, as a whole, provide the blockchain with those unique features that distinguish it from other distributed ledger technologies: immutability, transparency and anonimity. We note however that immutability comes at the expense of remarkable resource consumption, transparency demands no confidentiality and anonymity prevents user identification and registration. This is in stark contrast to the requirements of most IoT applications that are made up of resource constrained devices, whose data need to be kept confidential and users to be clearly known. Building on the proposed definition, we derive new guidelines for selecting the proper distributed ledger technology depending on application requirements and trust models, identifying common pitfalls leading to improper applications of the blockchain. We finally indicate a feasible role of the blockchain for the IoT: myriads of local, IoT transactions can be aggregated off-chain and then be successfully recorded on an external blockchain as a means of public accountability when required.