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Register a new userA Fast-Detection and Fault-Correction Algorithm against Persistent Fault Attack
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Added by
Cheng Yukun
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Persistent Fault Attack (PFA) is a recently proposed Fault Attack (FA) method in CHES 2018. It is able to recover full AES secret key in the Single-Byte-Fault scenario. It is demonstrated that classical FA countermeasures, such as Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) and mask protection, are unable to thwart PFA. In this paper, we propose a fast-detection and faultcorrection algorithm to prevent PFA. We construct a fixed input and output pair to detect faults rapidly. Then we build two extra redundant tables to store the relationship between the adjacent elements in the S-box, by which the algorithm can correct the faulty elements in the S-box. Our experimental results show that our algorithm can effectively prevent PFA in both Single-ByteFault and Multiple-Bytes-Faults scenarios. Compared with the classical FA countermeasures, our algorithm has a much better effect against PFA. Further, the time cost of our algorithm is 40% lower than the classical FA countermeasures.
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Side-channel and fault injection attacks reveal secret information by monitoring or manipulating the physical effects of computations involving secret variables. Circuit-level countermeasures help to deter these attacks, and traditionally such countermeasures have been developed for each attack vector separately. We demonstrate a multipurpose ring oscillator design - Programmable Ring Oscillator (PRO) to address both fault attacks and side-channel attacks in a generic, application-independent manner. PRO, as an integrated primitive, can provide on-chip side-channel resistance, power monitoring, and fault detection capabilities to a secure design. We present a grid of PROs monitoring the on-chip power network to detect anomalies. Such power anomalies may be caused by external factors such as electromagnetic fault injection and power glitches, as well as by internal factors such as hardware Trojans. By monitoring the frequency of the ring oscillators, we are able to detect the on-chip power anomaly in time as well as in location. Moreover, we show that the PROs can also inject a random noise pattern into a designs power consumption. By randomly switching the frequency of a ring oscillator, the resulting power-noise pattern significantly reduces the power-based side-channel leakage of a cipher. We discuss the design of PRO and present measurement results on a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA prototype, and we show that side-channel and fault vulnerabilities can be addressed at a low cost by introducing PRO to the design. We conclude that PRO can serve as an application-independent, multipurpose countermeasure.
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Reliable estimation (or measurement) of vehicle states has always been an active topic of research in the automotive industry and academia. Among the vehicle states, vehicle speed has a priority due to its critical importance in traction and stability control. Moreover, the emergence of new generation of communication technologies has brought a new avenue to traditional studies on vehicle estimation and control. To this end, this paper introduces a set of distributed function calculation algorithms for vehicle networks, robust to communication failures. The introduced algorithms enable each vehicle to gather information from other vehicles in the network in a distributed manner. A procedure to use such a bank of information for a single vehicle to diagnose and correct a possible fault in its own speed estimation/measurement is discussed. The functionality and performance of the proposed algorithms are verified via illustrative examples and simulation results.
Quantum error correction protects fragile quantum information by encoding it into a larger quantum system. These extra degrees of freedom enable the detection and correction of errors, but also increase the operational complexity of the encoded logical qubit. Fault-tolerant circuits contain the spread of errors while operating the logical qubit, and are essential for realizing error suppression in practice. While fault-tolerant design works in principle, it has not previously been demonstrated in an error-corrected physical system with native noise characteristics. In this work, we experimentally demonstrate fault-tolerant preparation, measurement, rotation, and stabilizer measurement of a Bacon-Shor logical qubit using 13 trapped ion qubits. When we compare these fault-tolerant protocols to non-fault tolerant protocols, we see significant reductions in the error rates of the logical primitives in the presence of noise. The result of fault-tolerant design is an average state preparation and measurement error of 0.6% and a Clifford gate error of 0.3% after error correction. Additionally, we prepare magic states with fidelities exceeding the distillation threshold, demonstrating all of the key single-qubit ingredients required for universal fault-tolerant operation. These results demonstrate that fault-tolerant circuits enable highly accurate logical primitives in current quantum systems. With improved two-qubit gates and the use of intermediate measurements, a stabilized logical qubit can be achieved.
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