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Register a new userPractical Byzantine Reliable Broadcast on Partially Connected Networks
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Added by
J\\'er\\'emie Decouchant
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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In this paper, we consider the Byzantine reliable broadcast problem on authenticated and partially connected networks. The state-of-the-art method to solve this problem consists in combining two algorithms from the literature. Handling asynchrony and faulty senders is typically done thanks to Gabriel Brachas authenticated double-echo broadcast protocol, which assumes an asynchronous fully connected network. Danny Dolevs algorithm can then be used to provide reliable communications between processes in the global fault model, where up to f processes among N can be faulty in a communication network that is at least 2f+1-connected. Following recent works that showed that Dolevs protocol can be made more practical thanks to several optimizations, we show that the state-of-the-art methods to solve our problem can be optimized thanks to layer-specific and cross-layer optimizations. Our simulations with the Omnet++ network simulator show that these optimizations can be efficiently combined to decrease the total amount of information transmitted or the protocols latency (e.g., respectively, -25% and -50% with a 16B payload, N=31 and f=4) compared to the state-of-the-art combination of Brachas and Dolevs protocols.
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