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Register a new userThe Longest-Chain Protocol Under Random Delays
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Added by
Suryanarayana Sankagiri
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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In the field of distributed consensus and blockchains, the synchronous communication model assumes that all messages between honest parties are delayed at most by a known constant $Delta$. Recent literature establishes that the longest-chain blockchain protocol is secure under the synchronous model. However, for a fixed mining rate, the security guarantees degrade with $Delta$. We analyze the performance of the longest-chain protocol under the assumption that the communication delays are random, independent, and identically distributed. This communication model allows for distributions with unbounded support and is a strict generalization of the synchronous model. We provide safety and liveness guarantees with simple, explicit bounds on the failure probabilities. These bounds hold for infinite-horizon executions and decay exponentially with the security parameter. In particular, we show that the longest-chain protocol has good security guarantees when delays are sporadically large and possibly unbounded, which is reflective of real-world network conditions.
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